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ABSTRACT 
 
3 ESSAYS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FIRM VALUE AND STARTEGY:  
EVIDENCE FROM FOUNDING FAMILY FIRMS  
Joon Mahn Lee 
Raphael Amit 
  
 In my dissertation, I examine how the corporate governance structure may affect 
the firm value in the market for control and affect strategic behavior of the firm. 
Particularly, I focus on founding family business firms which have been largely 
understudied in the management literature.   In my first essay, I empirically examine how 
founder management affects takeover premiums in mergers and acquisitions in 2000s.  I 
argue that a founder manager’s unique perspective, values, and influence on the process 
of the firm's strategic decisions may systematically affect the firm value of both the target 
and acquiring firms in the M&A market. I specifically examine how founder 
management affects both target firm value and bidder firm value. I suggest that it is not 
managerial control per se, but rather who the managers are and their priorities and 
preferences that most influence corporate value in the marker for control. The second 
essay analyzes the impact of family ownership, management and control on the strategic 
investment of the firm. I specifically examine the effect of family ownership 
concentration level, identity of management, and control enhancing mechanisms on R&D 
investments. I find that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between the ownership 
concentration levels of family controlled firms and R&D investment. I also find that 
firms with family shareholder managers are more likely to have higher levels of R&D 
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investment.  The third essay examines how family-control and business group affiliation 
may influence a firm’s investment in R&D. I argue that family control and business 
group affiliation have separate and distinct effects on firms’ strategic actions, although 
the two firm characteristics are often closely intertwined among firms. Our findings show 
that when a standalone firm is controlled by a family, the firm invests more in R&D. In 
contrast, I also find that when a family controls a business group, firms that belong to the 
family-controlled business group will invest less in R&D. My findings suggest that while 
families may generally have a long-term perspective for their firms, business groups may 
provide some incentives and opportunities to the families to expropriate the firm value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In my dissertation, I examine how the corporate governance structure of a firm 
may affect both the firm value in the market for control and the firm‘s strategic behavior. 
In particular, I focus on founding family business firms, which have been largely 
understudied in the management literature. I define a founding family business firm as a 
firm controlled by the founder or his or her family members. My reasons for studying the 
effect of the corporate governance structure of founding family firms are two-fold.  
 First, while founding family business firms are prevalent around the world, these 
firms are understudied compared to firms that have widely dispersed ownership . A 
growing number of studies shows that family business firms are common around the 
world (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), including the United States (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). For instance, Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, and Very (2007) report 
that family organizations account for over 65 percent of all firms worldwide. This 
prevalence of family business is seen not only among privately held firms but also among 
publicly traded corporations (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens 
et al., 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Since the agency relation 
of these family-controlled firms differ from widely held firms with separate ownership 
and control (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), the effects of 
conventional corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., ownership structure, takeover 
market, institutional investors, incentive compensations) may have different effects on 
family business firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Kole, 1997; 
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Shivdasani, 1993; Westphal, 1998). However, there are relatively few empirical tests in 
the management literature indicating how the corporate governance structure of a family 
business firm affects the firm‘s strategy.  
The second reason for studying the effect of the corporate governance structure of 
founding family firms is that family business firms provide unique settings where non-
economic utilities of powerful principals often come into conflict with economic 
concerns of other minor principals, resulting in strategic decisions that may create 
principal-principal agency problems. Understanding the non-economic utility of family 
business firms may provide important insights into such problems that have been 
overlooked by management scholars.  
 Recent studies have shown that family businesses are commonplace, not only in 
entrepreneurial firms, but also in large public firms (Anderson and Reed, 2003; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2009). However, previous studies on family firms have mainly 
focused on firms at the early development stage (e.g., pre-IPO era).  To address this gap 
in the literature,  I specifically focus on family firms that have made a transition to public 
ownership.  
 Family businesses in the post-IPO era may differ from family businesses in the 
pre-IPO era for two reasons: the decreased control power and commitment of the founder. 
At the firm's early stage, founders often play the central role, possessing considerable 
control power over all key strategic and operational decisions of the firm. However, as 
the company grows, the founders (and their family members) are often in a position to 
share ownership with others (e.g., founding partners, venture capitalists, employees, 
public investors) and delegate their decision-making positions to other employees of the 
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firm, resulting in dilution of their control power over the firm. Thus, especially after the 
post-IPO stage when the firm's ownership is diluted and the size is enlarged significantly, 
it is not obvious whether the existence of the founder  (and family members) in the firm 
may have strong control power that affects the firm's core decision-making process. The 
founders’ (and their family members') commitment to the firms may also decrease as they 
share their legacy with other players of the firm (Wasserman, 2006). In other words, the 
founders’ commitment is expected to decrease as psychological ownership of the firms 
diminish with increased formalization and reduced familiarity, which commonly follows 
the expansion of the organizations (Pierce & Barnell, 2001). Thus, it is critical to 
understand whether and how the existence of founders and their family members in 
publicly owned firms affect firms' strategic decisions in order to understand the firms’ 
strategic outcomes.   
 This dissertation contributes to two main streams of literature. First, by examining 
the relationship between family control and firms’ strategic decisions, I develop a new 
understanding of the importance of the controlling shareholder‘s identity in the corporate 
governance literature. Second, I extend the insights of the family business literature by 
studying  two dependent variables—strategic behavior and firm value—that are often 
overlooked.  
 
Outline of the dissertation 
 Following this introduction chapter (Chapter 1), the core of this dissertation is 
organized as three separate essays (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), each of which is focused on a 
specific research question.   
4 
 
 
 The core of the dissertation consists of three studies. The first study examines 
how founder manager status affects target firm value in the corporate takeover market, 
and, as a result, affects the acquirer‘s firm value. I propose that due to founders’ strong 
emotional attachment to their firms and their strong influence on the decision-making 
process, these founder-managed firms will change hands only when acquiring firms offer 
a larger takeover premium compared to that offered to counterpart firms. The second 
study examines how internal governance mechanisms may affect the strategic behavior of 
the firms. Specifically, I propose that family shareholder‘s ownership, management, and 
control may separately affect firm behavior such as investment decisions. The third study 
examines how external governance mechanisms such as a business group governance 
mode may interact with family control of firms. In this paper, I separately examine the 
effects of family control and business group affiliation on R&D investment and then 
examine their cumulative effect. I propose that a high overlap between the business group 
mode and family control among firms (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Orrú, Biggart, & 
Hamilton, 1997) has caused a problem in the empirical research and that it is important to 
distinguish their effects.  
Figure 1 summarizes the overall structure of the dissertation.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual links between the dissertation essays 
 
Following is a brief outline of the arguments in each of the essays presented in this 
dissertation. 
Essay One: Take it or leave it: Effect of founder managers on merger payoffs in large US 
public companies  
In the first essay, I study how founder managers and their family members may 
affect target firm value in the US M&A market. Rationally, for an acquisition deal to be 
successful, the target firm’s value should be lower than the bidder firm's reservation price 
(or withdrawal price) and higher than the target firm's reservation price (Burkart, 1995). 
In this essay, I argue that due to the unique characteristics of founders, founder managers 
in the target firms will have a higher reservation price and bargaining power compared to 
non-founder managers in negotiations with the acquiring firms.  
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I suggest that the dispositions and preferences of founder managers are different 
from those of non-founder managers, and these differences may result in different merger 
payoffs. I predict that these founder characteristics result in higher takeover premium of 
the target firms and negative abnormal return of the acquiring firms.  
The balance of power that exists between a founder manager and other key 
decision makers in target firms is an important concern of my argument. Since takeover 
negotiations are mostly conducted with only a few managers and the final decision is 
often made by the board of directors, decisions regarding a takeover will be in the hands 
of a small number of managers and directors (Moeller, 2005).  Thus, the balance of 
power between a founder manager and other managers and shareholders may affect the 
takeover premium of the target firm. Refining my argument, I expect that the relationship 
between founder-managed firms and the takeover premiums will be more prominent for 
firms in which the founder has higher control power.  
 Finally, it is important to examine if these founder effects may be inherited by 
succeeding descendent generations. I posit that compared to descendant-managed firms, 
founder managed firms will harvest a higher takeover premium because founders will 
have a higher commitment to the firm since they have contributed more to creating the 
firm, leading founders to have a higher reservation price.   
 
Essay Two: How do family ownership, management and control affect R&D investment? 
Evidence from Korean Family Firms  
 While essay one mainly focuses on founders of the firm, essays two and three 
focus on founders and their family members as a whole. In essay two, I study how the 
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family ownership structure shapes a firm's innovation strategy. Specifically, I propose 
that we cannot simply argue whether, on average, family controlled firms are more/or 
less likely to invest in R&D compared to non-family controlled firms. For a better 
understanding, we need to look inside the family business firm and understand the 
heterogeneity of the ownership structure and its affect on the investment decision. 
Drawing on arguments of agency theory, corporate governance literature, and family 
business literature, I examine three distinct questions in this paper. First, does family 
ownership increase or decrease a firm’s investment in innovation? Family shareholders 
are concerned with the non-economic value they have in the firm as well as the financial 
returns (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007).  In 
particular, family shareholders have a longer investment horizon compared to non-family 
shareholders since they are emotionally attached to the firm and have succession plans to 
continue the family’s legacy, and thus would be more likely to invest in long-term 
investments. However, as the ownership of the family shareholders increases, their 
incentives to derive private benefits rather than invest in innovation will increase.  The 
second question is: Does family management increase or decrease a firm’s investment in 
innovation? Because family management mitigates the traditional agency problem 
between the manager and shareholders, I posit that agency theory will predict a positive 
effect on R&D investment. Third, does family control increase or decrease a firm’s 
investment in innovation? While excessive control over actual cash flow rights gives the 
controlling family stronger monitoring ability to mitigate the traditional agency problem, 
at the same time, it provides incentives and control power to expropriate resources from 
the business for their own private benefits (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
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Essay Three: Influence of family-control and business group affiliation on firm R&D 
investment: Evidence from Korean business groups 
Compared to essay 1 and essay 2 which look at how internal governance 
mechanisms (e.g., ownership structure, management) affect the strategic decisions of 
founding family firms, essay 3 extends our focus on how outside governance mechanisms 
(e.g., business group affiliation) affect the strategic decisions of founding family firms. In 
this study, I propose that many previous studies of family business have erroneously 
attributed a phenomenon to family business attribution when it actually should have been 
attributed to business group affiliation and vice versa (Choi, Park, & Yoo, 2007). I argue 
that the lack of a clear distinction between the business group governance mode and 
family control in the empirical literature may be responsible for mixed, inconclusive 
findings about the effects of the two properties (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Bae, Kang, 
& Kim, 2002; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Perez-Gonzales, 2006).  In this study, I examine 
how business group affiliation and family control may influence R&D investment of the 
firm. First, I separately examine the effects of family-control and business group 
affiliation on R&D investment; then I examine their cumulative effect. I argue that a firm 
that is controlled by a family and is a member of a business group is less likely to invest 
in R&D than a standalone firm with dispersed ownership. However, if a firm is family 
controlled but not business group affiliated or if a firm is business group affiliated but not 
family controlled, then they are not likely to significantly differ from standalone firms 
with dispersed ownership regarding R&D investment.  
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ESSAY ONE: TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT: EFFECT OF FOUNDER MANAGERS 
ON MERGER PAYOFFS IN LARGE US PUBLIC COMPANIES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In  the  last  few  decades, management and finance scholars have developed a 
substantial body of  knowledge about Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) of firms (see 
Eckbo, 2009 and Haleblian et al., 2009 for recent review).  However, nearly all past 
studies of M&As have focused on firms that only have professional managers
1
 hired by 
the shareholders or at least have not been explicit about the difference between founder 
managers and hired professional managers.  This could be problematic since studies in 
entrepreneurship and family business report that founders (and their families) often stay 
in the firm in top management positions
2
, but they have a significantly different impact 
on the firms' operations and performance compared to professional managers (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997;  Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006; Jayaraman et al., 2000; Wasserman, 
2006). For example, Certo et al. (2001) indicates that 48% of IPO firms in their sample 
have CEOs who are also the firms’ founders. Similarly, Nelson (2003) reports that 64% 
of the firms at the IPO stage have founder managers.
 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) indicate 
that the presence of founders as CEOs is even common among the largest firms in the 
world, with over 20% of Fortune 500 firms having CEOs who are the founders.  
                                                          
1 In this paper, I use “professional manager,” and “non-founder manager” interchangeably.  
2 I define manager as a member of the top management team following an upper-echelon perspective (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). My primary focus is whether the firm has the founder as part of the top-management team rather than if 
the founder is strictly in the chief executive position. 
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 One of the most important events surrounding founder managers relates to 
receiving an acquisition offer. On the one hand, receiving an acquisition offer may lead to 
a direct source of sizable financial gain for the founder managers. On the other hand, the 
offer directly leads to loss of control of their lifetime legacy and failure to pass the firm 
on to their descendants. While previous studies on entrepreneurship and family business 
have emphasized the importance to founders of firm control (e.g., maintaining high 
control power in the firm, pursuing family succession) and of the firm's long-term 
survival (e.g., Bennedsen et al., 2007; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2009; Wasserman, 2003), they have not 
explicitly shown how this tendency may affect the firm’s value in the M&A market. This 
paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature and to provide a better understanding of the 
founder's role in the M&A market. 
 Drawing from upper echelons theory, entrepreneurship and family business 
literature, I posit that the dispositions and preferences of founder managers are different 
from those of non-founder managers, and these differences may result in different merger 
payoffs. Specifically, I argue that due to the unique characteristics of founders, founder 
managers in the target firms will have a higher reservation price and higher bargaining 
power compared to non-founder managers in negotiations with an acquiring firm. I 
predict that these founder characteristics result in a higher takeover premium of target 
firms and a lower abnormal return for acquiring firms. Refining my argument, I expect 
that the relationship between founder-managed firms and the takeover premium will be 
more prominent for firms in which the founder has higher control power. Comparing the 
takeover premiums of founder-managed firms and descendant-managed firms, I also 
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argue that the preferences of succeeding family generations may be different from those 
of the founding generation, resulting in a lower takeover premium of descendant-
managed firms.  
 The context for this study is the mergers and acquisitions market of large U.S. 
public firms. M&As provide a good empirical setting to study the effects of different 
types of managers. From the viewpoint of the target firm's management, receiving an 
acquisition offer is an event that may provide a direct source of financial gain but may 
also be a threat to their job security (Wulf, 2004). From the viewpoint of the bidder firm's 
management, an acquisition is an important investment decision which is likely to impact 
the short-term as well as long-term value. Thus, acquisitions generally require an active 
evaluation and negotiation process for all top managers in both the target firm and the 
bidder firm. More importantly, the effect of different manager types on the value of the 
target firm is immediately observable after the announcement through the takeover 
premium. I test my arguments using a unique hand-collected data set that includes 
detailed information about founders of 423 target firms over a 6-year period.  
 The test results are in line with my theoretical arguments. I find that founder-
managed firms are more likely to receive higher takeover premiums than non-founder 
managed firms. Second, I find that among founder-managed firms, target firms with a 
high-power founder are more likely to receive a higher takeover premium. Third, 
founder-managed firms are more likely to receive a higher takeover premium than 
descendant-managed firms. Finally, bidder firms that acquire firms with founder 
managers are more likely to experience lower abnormal returns than bidder firms that 
acquire firms with no founder manager. These findings are robust to a number of 
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sensitivity checks and econometric specifications as well as supplemental analyses and 
interviews that delve into the mechanisms.   
 Overall, this study makes several important contributions. This study contributes 
to the M&A literature that has mainly focused on the decisions of hired professional 
managers. Examining the preferences of founder managers reveals interesting viewpoints 
along corporate governance dimensions that have not yet been studied in M&A research. 
By incorporating the differences between founder managers and non-founder managers, 
the study also adds a new angle to top management team literature that should be 
considered to understand a top management's strategic decisions, especially the decisions 
that are often made exclusively by the managers such as takeover agreements.
3
 In 
addition, the study contributes to CEO succession literature by demonstrating that 
characteristics and preferences of succeeding family generations may be different from 
those of the founding generation, which should be carefully considered when making 
succession decisions. Lastly, the study also expands on the entrepreneurship and family 
business literature by empirically identifying the existence of the psychological value of 
founders, a concept that has been taken for granted yet not quantified in previous studies.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 Upper  echelons theory  suggests that the  strategic  decision making  of top 
executives  is  based  not  solely  on  rational  analysis,  but  also  on  idiosyncratic  
                                                          
3
 While entrepreneurship and family business scholars have focused on studying founder as in the CEO position (e.g., 
Certo et al. ,2001; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Nelson, 2003; Souder et al., 2011; Wasserman, 2003), this paper focus on 
founder as a part of the top-management team following the upper echelons perspective.  
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preferences (e.g., values, cognition, perception) that  can  stem  from  individual  
characteristics  and  backgrounds  (Hambrick  & Mason,  1984). This behavioral view of 
decision making based on the assumption of a bounded rationality assumption posits that 
to understand organizational decision making, scholars should consider the biases and 
dispositions of their most powerful actors—their top executives (Hambrick, 2007). Top 
managers' control of organizational resources and knowledge of organizational activities 
create an information asymmetry that enables them to act opportunistically, often to the 
detriment of shareholders (Tosi  & Gomez-Mejia,  1989).  Using this lens, a top manager 
is in a position to consider personal  preferences when  evaluating  a takeover deal (e.g., 
tender offer, friendly acquisition) and may influence the board of directors to act upon 
those preferences (Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994; Moeller, 2005).  Interestingly, 
juxtaposed with this theoretical perspective, the literature on entrepreneurship and family 
business suggests that founders often take managerial roles in the firm, and these founder 
managers systematically differ from non-founder managers which may lead to different 
responses to acquisition offers.  
Founders as Top Management 
 
 At the entrepreneurial stage, a founder plays a significant role in the organization, 
making “fate judging” decisions such as investment decisions, commercializing 
decisions, and financing decisions (Boeker, 1988). Although the founder’s key role may 
end at the early stage of the firm such as first product development or first capital 
financing (Boeker and Karichalil, 2002; Nelson, 2003), founders often take upper-
echelon positions in the firm (e.g., owners, executives, board members, or heads of an 
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operational unit) even after going through various external financing stages such as 
venture backing and an IPO offering (Certo et al., 2001; Nelson, 2003; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006; Wasserman, 2006). Due to their distinctive characteristics and unique 
relationship with the firm, founder managers differ from non-founder managers in several 
ways. First, founder managers are often characterized by their highly optimistic nature 
compared to non-founder managers (e.g., Busenitz & Barney 1997;  Dushnitsky, 2010; 
Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006; Wu & Knott, 2006). Second, a founder’s identity is 
tightly linked to that of the organization (Dobrev & Barnett, 1999). Thus, founder 
managers possess unique psychological characteristics (e.g., high intrinsic motivation, 
strong attachment) that may influence their decisions on firm strategy (Wasserman, 
2006). Founder managers also often have strong preferences to hand over the control of 
the firm to their successive family members as a family legacy (Casson, 1999), so 
founder managers may be willing to sacrifice firm performance in order to retain family 
control (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Lastly, founders are often the longest tenured 
members of the organization, which allows them to develop deeper knowledge of the 
firm and close relationships with key decision makers, enabling founders to act as the 
focal point for the decision makers in the firms (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
The effects of the differences between founder managers and non-founder 
managers may be intensified in organizational decisions when information and control 
power are concentrated in the top managers, particularly decisions about being acquired 
(Moeller, 2005). In the next section, I focus on why the effects of founder managers on 
firm value in the M&A market are different from that of non-founder managers. 
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Reservation Price and Bargaining Power of Founder Managers 
 
Rationally, an acquisition deal is pursued when there is an expected positive 
synergy gain from a transaction for both the bidder firm and target firm (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983). During the transaction process, both firms negotiate to attain a larger part 
of the expected synergy gain. For a deal to be successful, the target firm’s value should 
be lower than the bidder firm's reservation price (or withdrawal price) and higher than the 
target firm's reservation price (Burkart, 1995) (see figure 2). Then, the target and bidder 
use their own bargaining power to secure the highest expected economic gains from the 
transaction. Thus, both elements of the deal, reservation price and bargaining power, 
should be considered to decide an appropriate takeover premium, so the deal can be 
completed successfully.   In this paper, I argue that the takeover premium may be 
affected by the identity of the manager and suggest hypotheses as to the effect of founder 
managers on takeover premiums.
 4
  Specifically, I argue that due to the unique 
characteristics of founders, founder managers in the target firms will have a higher 
reservation price and higher bargaining power compared to non-founder managers in 
negotiations with an acquiring firm. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 In this paper, I use the terms “merger,” “acquisition” and “takeover” interchangeably. 
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Figure 2: Bargaining between target and acquirer firms within the reservation price 
 
 
 Founder-managers have higher reservation prices than non-founder managers 
because of their highly optimistic nature and stronger attachment to the firm. Founders 
are often characterized by their highly optimistic nature which may increase the 
reservation price of a founder-managed firm in the market for control.
 5
 Optimism as an 
entrepreneurial disposition is supported by many research findings indicating that 
entrepreneurs think highly of their potential success rate compared to others (e.g., 
Dushnitsky, 2010; Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006; Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006; Wu & 
Knott, 2006). For example, Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) find that in their 
sample of 2,994 entrepreneurs, more than 80% gave themselves at least a 70% chance of 
success, and 33% thought that their chance of success was a certain 100%. In a similar 
                                                          
5 Highly optimistic people tend to self-select for founding activities (de Meza & Southey, 1996).  Founders, like other 
people including professional managers, vary in how much confidence they place in their own abilities to generate 
future returns. While some will be overconfident, others will not be.  However, because it is difficult to discern an 
individual’s disposition ex ante, scholars and investors view founders as a collective group characterized by optimism 
when compared to others including professional managers (Manove & Padilla 1999, Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
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study, Busenitz and Barney (1997) show that entrepreneurs had a considerably higher 
level of confidence compared to others. Because of their highly optimistic nature, 
founders often estimate their firms’ potential economic value as higher than the value 
estimated by non-founder managers (Certo et al.,2001). Consequently, a founder's 
optimism may increase the reservation price of a founder-managed firm in the market for 
control.  
 Compared to non-founders, founders also have stronger attachment (Dobrev & 
Barnett, 2005; Jayaraman et al., 2000; Zaleznik & Kets de Vries, 1975) and commitment 
(Carroll, 1984) to their firms. Founders view their companies as extensions of 
themselves, sometimes to such an extent that there is an overlap of individual ego and the 
corporation (Handler, 1990; Levinson, 1971). Thus, while founders do value economic 
returns, they also value non-economic concerns that play into creating divergent 
objectives which is unlike most other managers or shareholders. Thus, when founders 
evaluate their own firms, they will likely include the anticipated psychological value
6
 in 
the firms’ expected economic value, resulting in high reservation prices of firms in the 
market for control. While non-founding owners and managers may also include the 
psychological value of the firm, I expect this effect to be accentuated for founder 
managers given their intrinsic and stronger attachment to the firm (Berrone et al., 2010). 
 Founder-managers may have higher bargaining power than non-founder managers 
for two reasons. A founder's long-term horizon in the firm will have a positive effect on 
the bargaining power when negotiating for the value of the firm. Founders are well 
                                                          
6 Previous studies such as Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001; 2003; 2007) use the term socio-emotional value and Zellweger and 
Astrachan (2008) use the term “emotional value,” but I use “psychological value” to be consistent with the upper echelons 
literature.  
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known for their  desire to promote long-term success and the survival of the firm (He, 
2008) since they often wish to pass the firm on to their descendants as a legacy of the 
family (Casson, 1999). Thus, founders are willing to maintain their control, even when 
they have to sacrifice short-term returns.  In contrast, non-founder managers represent the 
interests of short-term dispersed shareholders, so they tend to focus on short-term profit 
maximization (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991), resulting in a short-term horizon. This 
difference between the horizons of founder managers and non-founder managers creates 
a wedge between the bargaining power of these two types of managers.
7
  Founder 
managers may hold out and wait for a better deal if the offered premium does not meet 
their expectations. However, since a  takeover  bid simply  represents  an opportunity for 
diverse shareholders to achieve  capital  gain from a takeover  premium, non-founder 
managers are in a worse position to hold out from the deal and may be less willing to lose 
the deal if the bidder walks away, so non-founder managers are more likely to divest 
before all the benefits of the acquisition are realized (Grossman and Hart, 1980).  
 Founders are also more likely to have higher bargaining power because of their 
superior access to information compared to non-founder managers when negotiating in 
the market for control. Active founders are often the longest tenured members of the 
organization, which allows founders to develop close relationships with key decision 
makers of the firm (e.g., other managers, shareholders, debt-holders). Founders also have 
significant knowledge and experience in the organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) that 
may be difficult to pass on to other managers because of the tacitness of the knowledge 
                                                          
7
 In a similar vein, Gaspar and colleagues (2006) argue that shareholder investment horizons may affect the bargaining 
power of each party involved in an acquisition. They argue that managers of firms held by short-term shareholders can 
be expected to have a weaker bargaining position, since their shareholders are more likely to take the ‘‘Wall Street 
walk’’ and sell their holdings. Their results confirm that target firms with short-term shareholders are more likely to get 
lower premiums. 
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(Szulanski, 1996). For example, compared to managers who are relatively new to a firm, 
founder managers with a better understanding of the firms' tacit knowledge and 
organizational routines  may  envision a  superior "subjective productive  opportunity" set  
for the  firm (Penrose, 1959) which may be critical information in negotiations. Thus, 
founder managers can selectively pass information on to bidders and then take advantage 
of their positions in the negotiation process (Hitt, Ireland, & Harrison,  2001).  
These characteristics of a founder's effect on a high reservation price and high 
bargaining power are intertwined. For example, the high reservation price of the founder 
manager can lead to founder managers holding out from the negotiation table to gain 
bargaining power. Thus, while two elements of the deal (reservation price and bargaining 
power) are distinctive, they play a mutual role in the selection and value-appropriating 
process in the market for control. 
 
Effects of Founder Managers on Takeover Premiums  
 
 The implication of the foregoing points is that founder managers are likely to 
have a higher reservation price and higher bargaining power than non-founder managers 
when negotiating with bidder firms. These two separate but intertwined elements of the 
deal may increase the takeover premium paid to the target firms. When the transaction of 
control is negotiated, founder managers tend to approve the merger only if they are 
offered a premium that tops their higher reservation price. Thus, completed deals of firms 
managed by founders are most likely to come from acquirers that offer a takeover 
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premium over the reservation price of the founder managers.
 8
  Since founder managers 
have higher bargaining power, they are also likely to negotiate a higher takeover 
premium than non-founder managers. Therefore, I argue that among completed deals, 
founder-managed firms will be more likely to receive higher takeover premiums from 
bidder firms than other counterpart firms. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Founder-managed firms will receive higher takeover premiums 
than non-founder managed firms.   
 
 The balance of power that exists between a founder manager and other key 
decision makers in the target firm is an important concern of my argument. Although 
founders may not  agree to the acquisition if the offered premium is lower than their 
expectations, other firm decision makers (e.g., non-founder managers, outside 
blockholders, minority shareholders) may want to sell the firm to collect an immediate 
profit from the transaction. Similarly, a bidder firm may solicit a non-founder target 
CEO’s merger approval at a reduced takeover price by offering private benefits to the 
non-founder target CEO, such as positions in the merged firm or a better retirement 
package (Wulf & Singh, 2010). Since takeover negotiations are mostly conducted with 
only a few managers and the final decision is often made by the board of directors, 
decisions regarding the takeover will be in the hands of a small number of managers and 
                                                          
8 My prediction that the high optimism of founders related to a higher takeover premium  may be opposed by other 
entrepreneurial scholars who have studied the optimism of founders. For example, Dushnitsky (2010) argues that wary 
investors may decrease the founder's valuation of inventions since the founder’s evaluation would be unreasonably high, 
resulting in  an "optimism discount." However, while this may be applied to small entrepreneur firms that have lower 
bargaining power due to their need for fast financial support, this may not be true for large public firms that already 
have considerably large financial resources to survive in the short term and can hold out for a better deal than the one 
offered.   
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directors (Moeller, 2005).  Thus, the balance of power between a founder manager and 
other managers and shareholders may affect the takeover premium of the target firm. A 
high-powered founder manager as represented by a higher managerial position or higher 
level of ownership (e.g., Boeker and Karichalil, 2002; Finkelstein, 1992; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006), can push other managers and directors to act in the founder’s favor, 
resulting in negotiating for a high takeover premium.  Hence, I hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Target firms with founder managers in high ranking positions will 
receive a higher takeover premium than target firms with founder managers in 
low ranking positions.   
 
Hypothesis 2b: Target firms in which founder managers hold a larger ownership 
share will receive a higher takeover premium.    
 
 It is important to examine if these founder effects may be inherited by succeeding 
descendent generations. Previous entrepreneurship studies show that founders are 
strongly attached to their firms with the notion that the firms are their lifetime legacies. 
For founders, the business is regarded as an extension of themselves, a medium for their 
personal gratification and, above all, their own achievements (Levinson, 1971). However, 
family business literature argues that not only founders but also descendants of founders 
may have a reason to maintain the long-term legacy of the family since descendants often 
have grown up with the firm and may consider the firm to be a part of the family 
(Berrone et al., 2010; Block, 2010). Conversely, some studies have argued that the 
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interests of family members may be less homogeneous than commonly assumed (e.g., 
Kang & Sørensen, 1999; Lansberg, 1999) and that the interests of succeeding family 
generations may be quite different from those of the founding generation. There is reason 
to believe that later generations of family owners often do not share the founder’s longer-
term horizon and concern for the firm’s survival, but they are more interested in “cashing 
out” and using the family assets for their own personal benefit. Following this 
perspective, I posit that compared to the descendant-managed firms, founder managed 
firms will harvest a higher takeover premium because founders will have a higher 
commitment to the firm since they have contributed more to creating the firm, leading 
founders to have a higher reservation price.  Hence, I hypothesize that the presence of a 
founder as a manager in the target firm, will lead to a higher takeover premium then firms 
with only descendant managers.   
 
Hypothesis 3: Founder-managed firms will receive a higher takeover premium 
than descendant-managed firms. 
 
Effects of Founder Managers on Acquirer's Abnormal Return  
 
 The previous hypotheses generate important implications for the returns earned by 
the bidder firms.  For bidder firms, takeovers are important investment decisions, and at 
the same time, these acquisitions also have a strong impact on the value of their own 
firms. Thus, the takeover premium paid to target shareholders may affect the value of the 
acquiring firm. For example, Sirower (Krishnan, Hitt, & Park, 2007) finds that takeover 
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premiums inversely affected the acquirers' shareholder return. To the extent that founder-
managed firms do enjoy a higher takeover premium then non-founder managed firms due 
to the founder manager's high reservation price and high bargaining power, it stands to 
reason that target shareholders of founder-managed firms should take a larger portion of 
the expected economic gains from the acquisition as compared to the target shareholders 
of non-founder-managed firms. By implication, since bidder firms receive a smaller 
portion of the expected gains when they acquire founder-managed firms, their abnormal 
return after the acquisition announcement should be lower than when they acquire non-
founder-managed firms. Consequently, when a firm acquires a target firm that is 
managed by the founder, we should observe lower abnormal returns.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Bidder firms that acquire firms with founder managers are more 
likely to experience lower abnormal returns than bidder firms that acquire firms 
with non-founder managers. 
 
Previous empirical evidence indicates that returns to bidder shareholders in mergers are 
insignificant, at best, with many studies finding negative returns (Capron and Pistre, 
2002). Jensen (1986) suggests that bidder managers pay an overvalued takeover premium 
that brings them private benefits of control, but Roll (1986) interprets overbidding as a 
consequence of managerial hubris. However, this paper does not predict whether the 
acquisitions in the sample have either positive or negative effects on the total firm value. 
Instead, the comparison is limited to the bidder firm’s abnormal return of acquiring a 
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founder-managed firm and of acquiring a firm managed by a non-founder manager right 
after the acquisition announcement.  
 
METHODS 
 
The initial sample is drawn from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database 
on mergers and acquisitions.  The SDC database provides detailed data on the 
announcement date, deal attitude, and acquisition mode of an acquisition, as well as the 
fraction of the takeover price that was paid in cash. To verify the validity of M&A 
information in the SDC database, I crosscheck all reported M&A samples with Hoover’s 
database and media information. Stock market information and financial information are 
collected from the CRSP and Compustat databases. In addition, I collect standard 
industrial classification (SIC) codes, some control variables from Compustat, and 
corporate governance information from SEC filings. The focus of my analysis, however, 
is on the target firm's founder information from Hoover’s database, SEC filings, the Lexis 
database, and company websites. One of the difficulties is retrieving data about founders 
since the target firms were already “acquired” by the bidder firms and even some were 
“merged.” In addition, data of some firms were not provided by these sources. Thus, the 
research team consists of 3 undergraduate students searched various magazines and other 
archival sources to supplement the data.  
Acquisitions in the sample include announcements from 2001 to 2006, and both 
the acquiring and acquired firms are US based, publicly held firms. Financial institutions 
are excluded from the sample because they have different asset characteristics and 
objectives concerning financial risk. Additionally, they are generally subject to more 
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regulatory oversight and restrictions (e.g., financing decisions and capital structure). 
Furthermore, the bidder should own less than 50% of the target prior to the 
announcement of the deal, and must own at least 50% of the target’s shares afterwards.  
 I include only completed transactions with a transaction value of at least $100 
million because the main focus of this study is large public firms rather than firms that 
have just passed the entrepreneurial stage at which time the founder’s control power is 
obviously dominant within the firm.  Entrepreneurial firms are excluded also because 
firms in the early stages are financially constrained, resulting in relatively low bargaining 
power against financial resource providers (Dushnitsky, 2010; Graebner & Eisenhardt, 
2004) such as venture capital firms, investors, and the bidder firms. Additionally, 
takeover premiums often have greater and integration concerns and are more profound in 
larger acquisitions (Sirower, 1997).  
The initial sample includes 493 transactions that meet these criteria. Of these 
acquisitions, complete data are unavailable on 35 transactions which are included in the 
SDC dataset but do not meet any of the above conditions (e.g. inclusion of uncompleted 
deals, lack of market performance data on the target or acquiring firms). Complete 
acquisition data are available for 458 of these transactions, so they constitute the initial 
sample. In addition, I exclude transactions when the bidder and target were closely 
related before the merger announcement such as firms with the same parent companies. 
Also excluded are transactions when the target firms are state-owned organizations since 
this study is a comparison between widely held firms and family controlled public firms. 
This requirement eliminates 10 transactions. Checking if data items for the bidder and 
target for the relevant dates are available on CRSP, Compustat, and SEC filings reduces 
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the sample to 425 observations. Finally, to keep outliers or potential data errors from 
driving the results, I eliminate observations in which the target’s excess announcement 
return exceeds 200% (two observations). However, I also perform a test with the outliers 
and the results are mostly identical to the main results. Thus, the final sample for this 
target firm study consists of 423 transactions from 2001 to 2006. The mean revenues, 
sales, firm age, and net income between firms excluded from the final sample and firms 
included are compared. The t-tests reveal no statistically significant differences in the two 
groups, suggesting no exclusion bias.  Tables 1 and 2 show the acquisitions in the sample 
by industry and year. 
 
Table 1: Observation by Industry 
Name Frequency Percent 
Business Services 111 26.24% 
Instruments & Related Products 39 9.22% 
Chemicals & Allied Products 35 8.27% 
Oil & Gas Extraction 34 8.04% 
Electronics & Other Electric Equipment 33 7.80% 
Communications 22 5.20% 
Industrial Machinery & Equipment 21 4.96% 
Health Services 15 3.55% 
Food & Kindred Products 9 2.13% 
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services 9 2.13% 
Engineering & Management Services 8 1.89% 
Other 30 Industries 87 20.57% 
Total 423 100 
 
Table 2: Observation by Year 
Year  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Number of 
Observation 
81 55 55 68 83 81 423 
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Dependent Variables 
 
Target Takeover Premium. I calculate the target takeover premium as the excess price 
per share offer over the target’s share price one day prior to the announcement of the 
acquisition. The short event window ensures that most of the return can be attributed to 
the merger event. However, I perform a robustness check with a one-week event window 
and four-weeks event window. The main findings remain almost identical. Therefore, I 
define the target takeover premium as follows:  
Target Takeover Premium=  
{(price per share offered by bidder’s / target’s share price one day prior to the 
announcement) -1}*100 
Abnormal return of acquirer. I calculate the Abnormal return of acquirer as the excess 
return over the CRSP value weighted index using a one-day window prior to the 
acquisition announcement. The short event window is especially important for ensuring 
the merger event effect on the abnormal return of the acquirer since the acquirer will be 
more affected by other events besides the acquisition event in a long event window 
(Kothari & Warner, 2007).   
 
Independent Variables 
 
 Founder identities are collected from various sources including Hoover’s 
database, SEC filings, the Lexis database, company websites, and other library archives
9
. 
I categorize founders only if the SEC filing identified the person as a founder or the 
                                                          
9 In some cases, a firm was founded by a group of co-founders. In these cases, I define founder as a member of the co-
founder group and who maintains a higher rank and/or higher ownership of the firm. 
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person is identified as such in at least two other public data sources. Following Villalonga 
and Amit (2006), I do not consider any of the following individuals as founders: 
managers who became the largest non-institutional shareholder in their companies 
through the accumulation of stock-based compensation, through a spin-off, or through a 
management or leveraged buy-out; and managers behind investment management 
companies, venture capital funds, or leveraged buyout funds. A manager is defined as an 
executive who is a member of the inside directors in SEC filings. The Founder Manager 
variable is treated as a dummy variable by assigning a value of one to firms with the 
founder serving as the inside director and a value of zero to firms with no founder serving 
as the inside director. Also, the Founder CEO variable is treated as a dummy variable by 
assigning a value of one to firms with a founder CEO and a value of zero to firms with a 
non-founder CEO. I treat the Founder Chairman variable as a dummy variable by 
assigning a value of one to firms with a non-founder CEO but with the founder as the 
Chairman of the Board, and a value of zero otherwise. I treat the Low Rank Founder 
Manager variable as a dummy variable by assigning a value of one to firms with a 
founder who is a manager but does not have a role as either CEO or Chairman of the 
Board, and a value of zero otherwise. Descendant manager status is treated as a dummy 
variable assigning a value of one to firms with a descendant(s) of the founder serving as 
the inside director(s) (including CEO and chairman roles) and retired founders, and a 
value of zero otherwise. Finally, I define Founder Ownership Level as a percentage of the 
founder's firm equity share when the acquisition was announced.
10
   
 
                                                          
10 In our main analysis, I use the ownership level of a dominant founder as a proxy for the founder ownership level. As 
a robustness check, I also use sum of all co-founders as a proxy for founder ownership level and find consistent results. 
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Control Variables 
 
 The target takeover premium and the acquirer’s return from the acquisition may 
also be attributed to differences in the characteristics of each firm (e.g., the target and 
bidder) and the transaction. Thus, I include various types of control variables to address 
these issues.  
 
Firm Level Controls. The most direct effect on the takeover premium may come from 
the CEO of the target firm. A CEO of a target firm can make the final decision and 
intervene between the target firm’s shareholders (e.g., including founders) and the bidder 
firm (Moeller, 2005). Therefore, I use CEO Ownership of the target firm to control for 
the power of the CEO. I also include CEO Tenure (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 
2006) and CEO Age (Buchholtz & Ribbens, 1994) to control for other potential CEO 
effects on the takeover premium. I control for Non-Founder (or non-family) Blockholder 
Shares that may affect the results of the deal. As a result of the free-rider problem 
described in Grossman and Hart (1980), shareholder intervention is more feasible when 
firms have large blockholders. The proxy is calculated as the ratio of the number of 
shares (of all classes) held by all non-founder (or non-family) blockholders to the number 
of total shares outstanding.
11
 Most of the non-founder blockholders in my sample are 
financial institutions listed in the proxy as beneficial owners. I also control for Number of 
Non-Founder (or non-family) Blockholders. The Target Firm Size is measured by the 
                                                          
11 I define blockholders as shareholders that are listed in the target’s SEC filings as beneficial owners who hold at least 
5% of the target’s stock  following a commonly used cutoff level in finance.   
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logarithm of total assets, and Target Firm Profitability is measured by return on asset. 
The Acquirer Firm Size is also measured by the logarithm of total assets.  
 
Transaction Level Controls. The transaction level controls include the Proportion of the 
Cash to pay the acquisition by the bidder which may affect the takeover premium 
(Travlos, 1987). Dummy variables are used to characterize the deal as a Within State 
Transaction, Within Industry Transaction, Deal including Poison Pill, Mergers of 
Equals, Tender Offer, Friendly Acquisitions and Prior Rumors. Many recent M&A 
studies have shown that the takeover premiums are inversely related to the magnitude of 
the bid competition (Kagel & Levin, 1986; Schwert, 1996). The evidence shows that due 
to the presence of competition, the bidder firm’s manager will overvalue the target firm 
and acquire the firm despite the high takeover premium (Boone & Mulherin, 2008; 
Thaler, 1988). Following various studies in finance and management (e.g.,  Capron & 
Shen, 2007; Moeller, 2005; Moeller et al., 2004), I use a binary variable, Competing 
Bidder (as reported in SDC), that equals 1 when there is at least one other bidder for the 
same target and 0 otherwise.
12
 
 
Identification Strategy 
 
 In  an  ideal  experiment,  I  would  randomly  assign some firms to be managed 
by non-founders, while assigning others to be managed by founders, and observe how 
                                                          
12 I note that our measure related to competitive bidders is limited. For example, with this proxy, competition is rare but 
is more frequent for large acquirers than for small acquirers (Moeller et al., 2004). Despite the possible limitation, our 
proxy can be justified by many previous studies in finance and management (e.g., Capron & Shen, 2007; Moeller et al., 
2004) that have tested this measure and found no systematic bias that may alter our results.    
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founder managers may affect merger payoffs in the market for control. Unfortunately, in 
the real world, firm characteristics are not randomly distributed among founder-managed 
firms and non-founder-managed firms. To address this issue, I use OLS regression 
including numbers of firm-specific variables, deal-specific variables,  industry fixed 
effects and year fixed effects to control for confounding effects.
13
 To complement the 
OLS regression analysis in the robustness check section, I also use matching estimator 
methods to control for potential endogeneity bias.  Compared to the standard approach of 
adding controls to a linear regression, the matching estimator methodology eliminates the 
influence of non-comparable control group and treatment group observations (Rawley & 
Simcoe, 2010). Finally, I conduct a number of semi-constructed interviews
14
 with 
investment bankers, financial advisors, and M&A consultants who have participated in 
many M&A transactions including buying or selling founder managed firms. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Main Analysis  
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics and descriptive information of acquisitions in 
my sample. As revealed in Table 4, there are several notably high correlations among 
variables. For example, as expected, firms with founder CEOs have a high level of CEO 
ownership and CEO tenure. Target firms with founder CEOs are also more likely to be 
                                                          
13 I check the takeover premium measures for non-normality and left-truncation. The distributions seem close to 
normal, and little evidence of truncation emerges. Therefore, using OLS as the estimation method is appropriate. I also 
conduct my analyses using a truncated regression model. The results are almost identical to the main results. 
14 The purpose of the interviews was to gain insights of founder's reaction to M&A offers and isolate the mechanisms 
by which founder managers impact the M&A outcomes. The interviews were semi-structured, conducted both on the 
telephone and in person, ranging from about twenty minutes to two hours. 
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small in firm size. Figure 3 reports the average cumulative abnormal returns around the 
acquisition announcement for target firms in the various categories (i.e., founder CEO, 
founder chairman, low rank founder manager, descendant manager, non-founder 
manager). 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES Obs Mean S.D Min Max VARIABLES Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Target Premium 444 30.099 28.375 -34.74 179.2 # of Outside Blockholders 444 2.426 1.239 0 4 
Acquirer Return 444 -0.628 5.624 -31 26 Target Size 434 5.653 1.743 0.588 10.62 
Founder-Managed Firm 444 0.412 0.493 0 1 Target Profitability 439 -0.104 1.400 -17 6.48 
Founder CEO 444 0.236 0.425 0 1 Bidder Size 440 7.724 1.938 2.46 11.96 
Founder Chairman 444 0.068 0.251 0 1 Within Industry Deal 444 0.669 0.471 0 1 
Low Rank Founder 
Manager 
444 0.110 0.314 0 1 Within State Deal 444 0.255 0.436 0 1 
Descendant Manager 444 0.038 0.192 0 1 % of Cash 444 49.877 44.284 0 100 
Founder Ownership 444 5.552 11.062 0 76.7 Poison Pill 444 0.011 0.106 0 1 
CEO Ownership 440 5.169 8.686 0 65.2 Tender Offer 444 0.171 0.377 0 1 
CEO Tenure 442 7.029 6.061 0 54 Friendly Acquisition 444 0.966 0.181 0 1 
CEO Age 444 52.266 8.338 30 85 Prior Deal Rumor 444 0.036 0.187 0 1 
Largest Blockholder Share 443 15.818 15.124 0 88 Competing Bidder 444 0.050 0.217 0 1 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Target Premium 1.00                             
2 Acquirer Return -0.13 1.00                           
3 Founder-Managed Firm 0.18 -0.11 1.00                         
4 Founder CEO 0.14 -0.11 0.66 1.00                       
5 Founder Chairman 0.08 -0.04 0.32 -0.13 1.00                     
6 
Low Rank Founder 
Manager 0.04 -0.01 0.42 -0.20 -0.09 1.00                   
7 Descendant Manager -0.10 0.07 -0.14 -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 1.00                 
8 Founder Ownership 0.12 -0.02 0.43 0.35 0.27 -0.03 0.21 1.00               
9 CEO Ownership 0.13 -0.02 0.31 0.48 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 0.60 1.00             
10 CEO Tenure 0.02 -0.02 0.28 0.48 -0.17 -0.08 0.01 0.23 0.44 1.00           
11 CEO Age -0.09 0.06 -0.23 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 -0.01 -0.05 0.16 0.32 1.00         
12 Largest Blockholder Share -0.08 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 1.00       
13 # of Outside Blockholder -0.05 0.07 -0.11 -0.21 -0.01 0.12 0.05 -0.13 -0.13 -0.09 0.05 0.08 1.00     
14 Target Size -0.15 0.06 -0.28 -0.15 -0.07 -0.18 0.14 -0.13 -0.16 0.09 0.32 -0.11 -0.03 1.00   
15 Target Profitability -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.10 -0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.13 1.00 
16 Bidder Size -0.04 0.14 -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.02 0.14 -0.05 -0.01 0.45 0.05 
17 Within Industry Deal 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 
18 Within State Deal 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13 
19 % of Cash 0.05 0.17 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.10 -0.19 -0.01 
20 Poison Pill -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.08 0.00 
21 Tender Offer 0.13 0.10 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.12 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 
22 Friendly Acquisition -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.12 -0.02 
23 Prior Deal Rumor -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.18 -0.09 
24 Competing Bidder 0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.03 
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<Table 4: Correlation Matrix-Table Continued> 
    16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
16 Bidder Size 1.00                 
17 Within Industry Deal -0.16 1.00               
18 Within State Deal -0.16 0.05 1.00             
19 % of Cash 0.29 -0.04 -0.05 1.00           
20 Poison Pill 0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.00 1.00         
21 Tender Offer 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.20 0.12 1.00       
22 Friendly Acquisition -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.10 -0.25 1.00     
23 Prior Deal Rumor 0.14 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 1.00   
24 Competing Bidder 0.04 -0.08 -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 -0.13 0.12 1.00 
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Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal returns of target firms around the acquisition 
announcement 
 
To test the main hypotheses, I use OLS regression with industry and year fixed 
effects. Table 5 reports the results for hypotheses 1 and 2, which test the founder 
managers’ effects on the target takeover premium. Model 1 is the baseline model of 
founder managers’ effects on the target takeover premium. Model 2 allows us to test 
hypothesis 1,  model 3 allows us to test hypothesis 2a and model 4 allows us to test 
hypothesis 2b. The results from the baseline models are consistent with prior research in 
the M&A literature (e.g., Buchholtz & Ribbens, 1994; Gaspar et al., 2005; Officer, 2003; 
Song & Walkling, 1993).  Regarding these control variables, CEO Ownership and Tender 
Offer dummy variables have statistically significant and positive relationships with the 
Target Takeover Premium.  CEO Age has a statistically significant and negative 
relationship with the takeover premium of the target firm.  
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Table 5: Main Results of Target Takeover Premium 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Takeover Premium 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
H1: Founder-Managed Firm 
 
8.816***     
  
(3.296)     
        H2a: Founder CEO 
  
10.940**   
   
(4.441)   
        H2a: Founder Chairman 
  
11.790**   
   
(5.644)   
        H2a: Low Rank Founder Manager  
  
5.635   
   
(4.555)   
        H2b: Founder Ownership 
   
0.401** 
    
(0.181) 
H3: Descendant Manager 
 
-6.605 -5.979 -16.19* 
  
(7.937) (7.977) (8.510) 
CONTROLS 
   
 
CEO Ownership 0.557** 0.438* 0.392* 0.185 
 
(0.222) (0.225) (0.236) (0.277) 
CEO Tenure 0.137 -0.051 -0.090 0.161 
 
(0.277) (0.283) (0.300) (0.276) 
CEO Age -0.384* -0.295 -0.281 -0.383* 
 
(0.197) (0.201) (0.204) (0.198) 
Largest Blockholder Share -0.148 -0.143 -0.144 -0.192** 
 
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) 
Number of Outside Blockholder -0.347 -0.112 0.0113 -0.0114 
 
(1.217) (1.209) (1.217) (1.217) 
Target Size -0.564 0.032 0.015 -0.214 
 
(1.228) (1.236) (1.237) (1.233) 
Target Profitability -0.548 -0.541 -0.522 -0.558 
 
(0.981) (0.972) (0.976) (0.975) 
Bidder Size -0.719 -0.932 -0.896 -0.891 
 
(0.939) (0.934) (0.935) (0.937) 
Within Industry Transaction 2.676 1.910 1.575 1.903 
 
(3.341) (3.329) (3.345) (3.341) 
Within State Transaction 3.139 2.857 2.905 3.721 
 
(3.374) (3.346) (3.348) (3.365) 
% of Cash 0.022 0.030 0.030 0.0207 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Poison Pill -7.268 -8.353 -8.187 -9.7 
 
(13.300) (13.210) (13.240) (13.270) 
Tender Offer 8.569** 8.950** 8.978** 8.586** 
 
(4.098) (4.078) (4.084) (4.085) 
Friendly Acquisition -10.240 -9.518 -8.794 -9.656 
 
(9.116) (9.040) (9.057) (9.067) 
Prior Deal Rumor 0.432 1.309 1.705 0.408 
 
(8.115) (8.049) (8.053) (8.071) 
Competing Bidder 4.62 4.768 5.014 4.155 
 
(7.095) (7.044) (7.044) (7.062) 
Constant 52.440* 45.180 43.100 51.89* 
 
(31.260) (31.160) (31.210) (31.110) 
Observations 423 423 423 423 
R-squared 0.220 0.238 0.243 0.233 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, industry and year dummies are 
included. Baseline category of firms' manager status is the non-founder managed firm. 
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In hypothesis 1, I predict that firms with founder managers will receive a higher 
takeover premium from acquirers than firms with non-founder managers. This prediction 
is supported at the 0.01 level of significance (Model 2). Note that the baseline category is 
firms with no founder in the management position.  Considering the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients, I find that firms that have the founder in a management position 
receive a 8.9% higher takeover premium than firms that have no founder in the 
management position. With an average target market value of $2.4 billion, the results 
here are of substantial economic significance. My interviews with investment bankers 
and M&A consultants confirm this findings and provide insights into the mechanisms.  
 As the director of investment bank noted: 
"Trying to buy a firm with founder in the firm is a tough quest. [...] To 
make the deal happen, two steps should be taken. First, we need to 
persuade the stubborn founder [to sell the firm] who has no intention to 
sell the firm whatsoever. Secondly, even after we successfully persuaded 
him to consider selling the firm, we still need to convince him that the 
price [of the firm] is not as high as he believes. [...] They all believe that 
their firm has a rosy future. [...] At the end of the deal, the buyers end up 
paying more than they expected to acquire the [founder managed] firm" 
 One M&A consultant mentioned that: 
 "Their (founders') argument is simple but persuasive. They already have 
enough money [which they earned during various financing stages] to 
spend for the rest of their lives. [...] Therefore,  they have no reason to sell 
the firm unless they feel they are fully compensated. [...]"  
In hypothesis 2a, I predict that firms with the founder as the CEO or chairman 
will receive a higher takeover premium than other founders. To test hypothesis 2a, I run 
an analysis that separates founder managers into three different categories: founder CEO, 
founder chairman, and low rank founder managers. Model 3 in Table 5 shows the results 
that when the categories are separated, only firms with founder CEOs and founder 
39 
 
 
chairmen are significantly different from firms with non-founder managers. Thus, I can 
interpret the results as firms that have founders with high power over other managers or 
in the board room may be able to receive larger takeover premiums as compared to firms 
that have non-founder managers.
15
 Nevertheless, descriptively, I also find that firms with 
low rank founder managers receive higher takeover premiums (Figure 3).  
In hypothesis 2b, I predict that the target firm’s takeover premium is positively 
related to the ownership level of the founders. Consistent with this hypothesis, the 
coefficient of the founder ownership level in Table 5 is positive at the 0.05 level of 
significance. The results indicate that a 1% increase in founder ownership level relates to 
a 0.401% increase in takeover premium of target firms (Model 4). This findings can be 
backed up by the interview with the director of the investment bank.  
"If you look inside the managerial meetings or BOD meetings [after 
receiving the M&A offer], you often observe conflicts of interest. Some 
may want to sell the firm, some may not. [...] It mostly depends on the 
decision of the most powerful person in the room, who often is the 
founder. This becomes more significant if the founder is CEO or majority 
shareholder." 
In hypothesis 3, I predict that firms managed by the founders will receive a higher 
takeover premium than firms managed by descendants of the founder. To answer this 
question, I compare the regression coefficients of the founder-managed firms (and 
founder CEO firms) with those of descendant-managed firms using the Wald test. The 
results in Table 6 reveal that the coefficient for founder-managed firms is significantly 
different from that of descendant-managed firms, supporting hypothesis 3.  
                                                          
15 When I conduct the Wald test to compare the regression coefficients of firms with a founder CEO and firms with a 
low rank founder manager and the regression coefficients of firms with a founder chairman with those of a low rank 
founder manager, the tests suggest that the coefficients of firms with a founder CEO and founder chairman and those of 
low rank founder manager are not significantly different.  
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Table 6: Difference between Coefficient Estimates using the Wald Test 
 
Null Hypothesis F Value Prob > F 
H3 
Founder Manager=Descendant Manager 3.52 0.0613 
Founder CEO=Descendant Manager 3.97 0.0471 
 
 In hypothesis 4, I predict that a bidder firm acquiring a firm that is managed by 
the founder will experience a lower abnormal  return than  a bidder firm acquiring a firm 
managed by a non-founder. One of the shortcomings of the measure of a lower abnormal 
return is that since acquirers are typically much larger than target firms, other noise 
factors may cover up the takeover effect. Therefore, the effect of the takeover on an 
acquirer abnormal return may be difficult to observe. Thus, to observe the effect more 
clearly, I perform two different tests. First, using all samples, I make a stronger form of 
the hypothesis by arguing that when an acquirer firm acquires a target firm that has the 
founder as the CEO, I should observe a lower abnormal return. Table 7 shows the results 
for hypothesis 4. Second, following previous studies in finance (e.g., Moeller, 2005), I 
limit the samples to firms with a high target size/acquirer size ratio (30% or higher) to 
lower the noise effects of other potential factors. Model 5 is the baseline model of the 
founder manager's effect on the acquirer's abnormal return. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, I find support for the stronger form of the analysis (Model 6) and also for the 
sub-sample analysis (Model 7).  
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Table 7: Main Results of Acquirer Abnormal Return 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Acquirer Abnormal Return 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Founder Managed Firm     -3.442** 
      (1.538) 
        Founder CEO   -1.597*   
 
  (0.942)   
        Founder Chairman   -0.862   
 
  (1.198)   
        Low Rank Founder Manager    -0.516   
    (0.967)   
Descendant Manager   0.298 -1.334 
    (1.693) (3.313) 
CEO Ownership 0.008 0.035 0.092 
  (0.047) (0.050) (0.101) 
CEO Tenure -0.029 0.009 0.069 
  (0.058) (0.064) (0.122) 
CEO Age 0.033 0.016 -0.085 
  (0.041) (0.043) (0.096) 
Largest Blockholder Share 0.001 0.000 0.010 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.049) 
Number of Outside Blockholder 0.215 0.164 0.439 
  (0.256) (0.258) (0.543) 
Target Size -0.128 -0.185 -1.275 
  (0.258) (0.262) (1.233) 
Target Profitability 0.148 0.156 -0.564 
  (0.206) (0.207) (0.801) 
Bidder Size 0.303 0.316 1.248 
  (0.197) (0.198) (1.213) 
Within Industry Transaction -0.441 -0.350 -0.995 
  (0.702) (0.710) (1.744) 
Within State Transaction 0.755 0.775 0.960 
  (0.709) (0.710) (1.431) 
% of Cash 0.015* 0.015* 0.014 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) 
Poison Pill 1.276 1.232 -1.153 
  (2.793) (2.809) (5.560) 
Tender Offer 1.110 1.025 1.417 
  (0.861) (0.867) (2.476) 
Friendly Acquisition 0.427 0.249 -3.090 
  (1.915) (1.922) (3.672) 
Prior Deal Rumor 0.203 0.067 1.923 
  (1.705) (1.709) (3.657) 
Competing Bidder -0.115 -0.171 -0.048 
  (1.490) (1.495) (3.591) 
Constant -4.243 -2.946 -1.727 
  (6.567) (6.624) (11.810) 
Observations 423 423 164 
R-squared 0.172 0.18 0.348 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, industry and year dummies are 
included. 
Baseline category of firms' manager status is the non-founder managed firm. 
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Supplemental Analysis and Alternative Explanations  
 
 One key question that may arise from my main arguments and findings is that 
whether the findings come from higher reservation price of founder managers or from 
higher bargaining power of founder managers.  To examine this question in more detail, I 
conduct a supplemental analysis using information of previous founding experiences of 
the founder CEOs. I categorize a founder to have previous founding experience if founder 
has, at least, an experience of establishing a firm and exiting from the firm before the 
main acquisition event in my study. While somewhat crude, previous founding 
experience of a founder CEO may be a good measure that can disentangle the effect of 
two different mechanisms (i.e., reservation price and bargaining power mechanisms) for 
following reasons. First, if a founder has previous founding experience, the founder will 
have less attachment and less commitment to the focal firm compared to the founder 
having the focal firm as the 'only and first baby'. Also, a founder with previous founding 
experience will be more likely to value the firm objectively compared to one with no 
previous experience.  Thus, a founder with previous founding experience will have lower 
reservation price compared to a founder with no founding experience. Secondly, if a 
founder has previous founding experience, the founder will have higher bargaining power 
than one that has no founding experience since the founder has the experience of 
negotiating to obtain financial compensation in exchange for the previous firm's control 
(Paik, 2010). Thus, founder with previous founding experience will have lower 
reservation price and higher bargaining power than one with no previous founding 
experience. Hence, in my supplemental analysis, if I find the founder with no experience 
receive higher takeover premium compared to founder with experience, reservation price 
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argument can be regarded as more powerful mechanism and vice versa. Among my 
sample of founder CEOs, approximately 36% of them had prior founding experiences. 
The results, reported in Table 8, fully support that reservation price argument is more 
prevailing than bargaining power argument in my settings.  
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Table 8: Supplemental Analysis on Founding Experience of Founder CEO 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Takeover Premium 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Model 8 
Founder CEO 14.61*** 
  (4.787) 
Founder CEO * Founding Experience -11.78** 
  (5.886) 
Founder Chairman 11.54** 
  (5.622) 
Founder Manager 5.796 
  (4.537) 
Descendant Manager -5.954 
  (7.943) 
CEO Ownership 0.469** 
  (0.238) 
CEO Tenure -0.119 
  (0.299) 
CEO Age -0.239 
  (0.204) 
Largest Blockholder Share -0.148 
  (0.095) 
Number of Outside Blockholder -0.038 
  (1.212) 
Target Size -0.145 
  (1.234) 
Target Profitability -0.585 
  (0.973) 
Bidder Size -0.807 
  (0.932) 
Within Industry Transaction 2.074 
  (3.340) 
Within State Transaction 2.531 
  (3.339) 
% of Cash 0.0271 
  (0.040) 
Poison Pill -8.029 
  (13.180) 
Tender Offer 8.752** 
  (4.068) 
Friendly Acquisition -10.57 
  (9.063) 
Prior Deal Rumor 2.026 
  (8.021) 
Competing Bidder 4.314 
  (7.023) 
Constant 43.31 
  -31.08 
Observations 423 
R-squared 0.251 
 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, industry and year dummies are 
included. 
Baseline category of firms' manager status is the non-founder managed firm. 
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 Results on the founder managers' effect on the takeover premium suggest a few 
alternative explanations, which I attempt to rule out in this section. One alternative 
explanation following human capital theory (Becker , 1962; Castanias & Helfat,1991; 
Harris & Helfat, 1997) is that since the founders have better knowledge of the firm and 
networks in the firm,  founder managers may have superior capability to pursue better 
post-merger integration than non-founder managers.
16
  For example, with experiential 
knowledge of the firm's employees, founders can match employee skills to new projects 
that can be performed with the acquiring firm and match employees to new team settings  
(Graebner, 2004; Prescott & Visscher, 1980). Identifying the appropriate productive 
synergies with the acquiring firm and effectively allocating financial and human 
resources to seize these opportunities can increase post-merger performance. Therefore, 
the acquirer may be paying more of a takeover premium to founder managed firms. 
However, if this is the case, the abnormal return of a bidder firm which acquired a firm 
with a founder manager and that of a bidder firm which acquired a firm with a non-
founder manager should not be significantly different, which is not true of my result for 
hypothesis 4. Furthermore, if this is the case, the retention rate of founder managers 
should be higher than that of non-founder managers after the acquisition since the 
acquirer has paid a larger takeover premium to preserve the superior ability of the 
founder manager. However, the supplemental data on the CEO retention rate indicates 
that there is no difference between founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs (see table 9).   
 
 
                                                          
16 Note that capabilities of founders other than capabilities related to an ex-post merger should have already been 
reflected in the market value of the firm.  
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Table 9: CEO Retention Rate after Acquisition 
  
At acquisition 
announcement 
1 year after 
acquisition 
effective  
(%) 
2 year after 
acquisition 
effective  
(%) 
Founder CEO 105 45 42.86% 28 26.67% 
Non-founder CEO 341 146 42.82% 85 24.93% 
 
 Another alternative explanation following agency theory (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986; Stulz, 1988) is that if ex ante firm performance is negatively related to founder 
managers due to their entrenchment of firm value, a larger premium can be paid to 
overcome the target firm's inefficiencies. For example, founder-managed firms may have 
been discounted ex ante in the market due to an agency problem caused by the founder. 
Thus, paying a higher takeover premium may mean paying for the right ex post merger 
firm value. However, if this is the case, there should be no significant difference between 
an abnormal return of a bidder firm which acquires a firm with a founder manager and 
that of a bidder firm which acquires firm with a non-founder manager, which is not true 
in my results. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
 I conduct several tests to verify the robustness of the results. An important issue 
to consider with my analysis is the possibility of observable control variables having 
confounding effects, which could potentially bias the estimates. To test the robustness of 
my results to this potential endogeneity bias, I use a matching estimator approach. 
Specifically, I use the bias-corrected nearest-neighbor matching estimator proposed by 
Abadie and Imbens (2006). This matching estimator method eliminates the influence of 
non-comparable control and treatment group observations which may cause a 
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confounding effect with observable control variables. The treatment group is drawn from 
the founder managed firms and the control group is drawn from the non-founder-
managed firms. For each firm i in the treatment (or control) group, the standard nearest-
neighbor matching estimator searches for the most similar firm to the control (or 
treatment) group. I match firms based on the attributes of the target firm and acquiring 
firm, and deal characteristics that are used in my main analyses. All firms that do not find 
a similar match are dropped from the analysis. I conduct matching estimator analyses for 
hypotheses 1 and 4. Figures 4 and 5 plot the kernel densities of the propensity scores for 
the unmatched and matched treatment and control groups using samples in the matching 
method to test hypotheses 1 and 4, respectively. The effectiveness of the matching 
procedure is evident from greater similarity in kernel densities among the matched groups 
as compared to the unmatched groups. Hypothesis 1 is supported if I find that the 
difference in the takeover premium between the matched treatment and control groups is 
significant in the predicted direction. Likewise, hypothesis 4 is supported if I find that the 
difference in the acquired abnormal return between the matched treatment and control 
groups is significant in the predicted direction. The results, reported in Table 10, fully 
support hypotheses 1 and 4.
17
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 While I would have preferred to use this methodology to test the robustness of hypotheses 2 and 3 as well, I am 
limited by the data. 
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Figure 4: Propensity score of treatment (founder-managed firms) and control (non-
founder-managed firms) groups before and after matching for samples used in H1 
  
Figure 5: Propensity score of treatment (founder-managed firms) and control (non-
founder-managed firms) groups before and after matching for samples used in H4 
 
 
Table 10: Sample Average Treatment Effect for Takeover Premium and Acquirer 
Abnormal Return 
 
Hypothesis Predicted Sign Coefficient
a Number of 
Observations 
H1 (Founder Managed Firm vs. 
Non-Founder Managed Firm) 
+ve 
7.845** 
(3.352) 
423 
H4 (Founder Managed Firm vs. 
Non-Founder Managed Firm) 
-ve 
-2.701** 
(1.281) 
164 
 a
 Sample average treatment effect for the treatment group 
 *Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.05 
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Another important issue to be considered to translate announcement returns (i.e., 
takeover premium) as merger payoffs is that the deals are surprising events. If investors 
could fully expect a merger, the abnormal announcement returns should be zero. The 
relatively low frequency of M&A transactions and the significant stock price movements 
associated with them support this assumption, but to some degree, information leaks may 
exist. For example, Figure 3 shows that there are small but steady increase of market 
value of the firms preceding the official acquisition announcement. Thus, to test whether 
my results are sensitive to information leakage, I perform a robustness check with longer 
event windows for the takeover premium (e.g., a one-week event window and a four-
week event window). The results are consistent.  
 Another issue to consider with my analysis is the possibility of firms’ growth 
stage effects. While the value of a firm's growth opportunity is already reflected in the 
market value, the potential value of the synergy created by an acquisition may be larger 
for firms in the early stages than firms in the later stages, resulting in a high takeover 
premium. To test the robustness of the results for this potential growth stage effect, I 
perform two additional tests. First, I add a Firm Age control variable to the main 
regression analysis. The Firm Age control is not added to the main analysis because it is 
difficult to retrieve the exact firm age, resulting in missing data for 34 firms in the final 
sample. Since firm age is more difficult to extract for older firms where the founder 
managers have retired, extracting firms without information about firm age from the 
analysis may systematically affect the results. However, when I add the Firm Age control 
in the robustness checks, the results remain almost identical. Second, there may be 
concern about sample-selection bias since older firms (over 50 years old) should not have 
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founders as managers. Thus, I run an analysis with firms that had been operating for less 
than 50 years to test the robustness of my results. I find consistent results compared to the 
main results.  
 Another frequently considered issue in the studies of takeover premium is the 
possibility of a self selection bias. However, this issue will not concern my findings. For 
example, the existence of a founder in a firm may decrease the likelihood of a M&A 
transaction being a target firm since bidder firms that are not able to satisfy the high 
reservation price of a founder-managed firm will not choose to bid on the firm. Thus, if 
any self-selection bias existed, it would lead us to slightly underestimate the takeover 
premium of founder-managed firms, and would work against my arguments and findings. 
This paper also does not  attempt to separate the selection effect (i.e., higher reservation 
price) from the value appropriation affect (i.e., higher bargaining power) but suggests that 
a takeover premium of completed deals may differ between founder managers and other 
counterparts due to these two distinct but potentially interrelated features. Thus, since my 
argument embraces possible self selection as one of the mechanisms, the existence of a 
self-selection bias does not hinder my findings.   
 Lastly, to verify the validity of the main model, I test for multicollinearity among 
independent variables by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF) (Kleinbaum et al., 
1998) in the main regression models. The VIF levels that I observe are smaller than 2, 
which are much smaller than the critical threshold of 10, and thus they eliminate the 
concern about multicollinearity issues in the regression analysis. However, related to 
hypothesis 2b, multicollinearity issue can still be a concern due to high correlation 
between founder ownership and CEO ownership. This is due to the fact that there are 
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many founders who are CEOs of the firms in my sample. Therefore, to eliminate this 
issue, I conduct a sub-sample analysis to study the effects of founder ownership with only 
founder managed firm observations. In this analysis, I exclude CEO ownership level 
variable (Table 11). I find consistent results compared to the main results. 
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Table 11: Sub-Sample Analysis of Founder-Managed Firms 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Takeover Premium 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Model 9 Model 10 
Founder Ownership   0.459** 
    (0.223) 
CONTROLS   
CEO Tenure 0.323 0.199 
  (0.414) (0.414) 
CEO Age -0.437 -0.533 
  (0.373) (0.372) 
Largest Blockholder Share -0.175 -0.276 
  (0.204) (0.208) 
Number of Outside Blockholder -1.937 -0.851 
  (2.390) (2.428) 
Target Size 0.089 0.730 
  (2.246) (2.246) 
Target Profitability 0.120 0.142 
  (1.463) (1.447) 
Bidder Size -3.478** -3.776** 
  (1.749) (1.737) 
Within Industry Transaction -3.638 -3.625 
  (6.462) (6.392) 
Within State Transaction 4.742 5.095 
  (6.466) (6.398) 
% of Cash 0.048 0.040 
  (0.075) (0.074) 
Poison Pill 39.980 40.310 
  (38.140) (37.730) 
Tender Offer 12.580 11.220 
  (9.084) (9.013) 
Friendly Acquisition 8.618 8.867 
  (21.390) (21.160) 
Prior Deal Rumor -6.148 -6.972 
  (21.840) (21.610) 
Competing Bidder 1.944 2.890 
  (16.310) (16.150) 
Constant 20.510 23.090 
  (66.170) (65.470) 
Observations 177 177 
R-squared 0.313 0.333 
  Robust Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, industry and year dummies are 
included. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 Effects of top executives on firms’ strategic decisions have been widely studied in 
the management literature. While great progress has been made in our understanding of 
professional managers and their strategic decisions (see Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & 
Sanders, 2004 for a recent review), the literature has been surprisingly silent on founder 
managers in the top management teams and their strategic decisions. Founder managers 
holding managerial positions are commonplace, not only in entrepreneurial firms 
(Wasserman, 2006), but also in large public firms (Villalonga & Amit, 2009). This paper 
examines how founder managers may affect the merger payoffs for both target and 
acquirer firms compared to non-founder managers. Following upper echelons theory, I 
theorize that understanding the background, experience, and values of top managers is 
important in explaining the choices they make. Borrowing from entrepreneurship and 
family business literature, I posit that the disposition and preferences of founder 
managers are different from those of non-founder managers and these differences will 
result in different merger payoffs.  
 The context for the study is mergers and acquisitions of large U.S. public 
companies. I test the arguments using a unique hand-collected dataset that includes 
detailed information on founders of 423 target firms over a 6-year period. I find that 
founder-managed target firms benefit more from takeover offers than non-founder-
managed target firms. The findings reveal that among firms with founder managers, those 
with founder managers in high ranking positions or high ownership levels receive higher 
takeover premiums. I also find that founder-managed firms receive higher takeover 
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premiums than descendant-managed firms. Conversely, firms that acquire firms managed 
by the founders have lower abnormal returns compared to firms that acquire firms 
managed by non-founder managers. These findings are robust to a number of sensitivity 
checks and econometric specifications as well as supplemental analyses and interviews 
that delve into the mechanisms.   
 My findings make several important contributions that warrant further discussion. 
This study contributes to the M&A literature by being one of the first studies to address 
the distinctive interests of founder managers in the M&A market. Since most studies of 
M&As assume univocal interest of top managers, previous studies often ignore the fact 
that managers have heterogeneous interests that may enable managers to pursue (decline) 
deals that conflict (converge) with the goals of the shareholders. For example, while non-
founder managers may be more interested in their own financial return and job security 
during the M&A negotiation process (Wulf, 2004; Wulf and Singh, 2010), founder 
managers may be more interested in preserving their own legacies and the long-term 
survival of their firms. Thus, this potential conflict between founder managers and non-
founder managers introduces managerial heterogeneity, wherein the interests of the 
managers of the target firms temporarily diverge during specific M&A deals. 
 This study also contributes to the top management team literature, which, to date, 
has mainly focused on the characteristics and effects of hired professional managers. In 
contrast, this study is one of the few studies to show that having a founder in a firm’s top 
management team will have a significant impact on the firm’s strategic decisions. 
Notable exceptions are Kor's (2003) study on founder manager effects on entrepreneurial 
growth of the firm. With their unique relationships within their firms, founders may 
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impose different preferences (e.g., values, cognition, perspectives) on top management 
teams compared to non-founder managers. Specifically, founders may want to pursue 
idiosyncratic psychological value by sacrificing short-term economic value which may 
lead to conflicts between the founder managers and other decision makers in the firm. My 
findings support the idea that founder managers may bypass small but immediate gains 
and wait for sizable rewards that incorporate psychological value as well as economic 
value. By incorporating the differences in dispositions and preferences between founder 
managers and non-founder managers, the study adds a new angle that should be 
considered in the upper echelons area. For example, while previous studies have 
vigorously studied the difference between managers who have been promoted from 
inside and managers who have been promoted from outside (e.g., Boeker & Goodstein, 
1993; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010), it would be equally 
important to understand how differences between founder managers and non-founder 
managers affect the strategic decisions and outcomes of firms.      
 The study also contributes to CEO succession literature by demonstrating that 
characteristics and preferences of succeeding family generations may be different from 
those of the founding generation. While previous studies on family CEO succession have 
argued that succeeding family CEOs may underperform mostly because they are selected 
from a small pool of managerial talent (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Perez-Gonza lez, 2006), 
my findings suggest that the motivation of the succeeding family CEOs may be another 
reason for their underperformance. Unlike previous studies that have commonly assumed 
that, similar to founders, the succeeding family members will try to maintain the long-
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term legacy of the family, my findings reveal that they are more interested in “cashing 
out” and using the family assets for their own personal benefit.  
Another contribution of these findings is that I expand on the entrepreneurship 
and family business literature by identifying the existence of the psychological value that 
the founder has in the firm. While previous studies on entrepreneurship and family 
business have implicitly assumed that psychological value exists for the founding family 
members, no study has explicitly tested the existence of psychological value. By using 
takeover premium data in the market for control, I perform explicit tests and find that 
psychological value exists among founders. 
 For practitioners, our findings indicate that founder-managed firms may be 
particularly difficult to buy or may be expensive in the M&A market, leading to a 
negative effect on the acquirer's abnormal return. A careful and objective evaluation of a 
potentially acquired firm may be necessary to achieve convergence in price between the 
founder managers and other key decision makers of the deal. Assessments from 
independent outsiders, financial advisory firms, and consulting firms may be a good way 
to converge the difference in price. Our findings also suggest that investors should 
consider the identity of managers (e.g., founders, descendants, or non-founders) before 
participating in a potential M&A event.  
 The study is not without limitations. First, while I am positing that two different 
mechanisms, reservation price, and bargaining power, are part of  my main prediction, 
this study do not allow the isolation of the two mechanisms in the empirical analysis,  
but, rather, consider them as intertwined mechanisms. Thus, in the future, it would be 
ideal if a study could isolate the two different mechanisms and compare which 
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mechanism may be more dominant for founder managers in the M&A market. However, 
in this paper, note that I am not making any predictions on whether the higher takeover 
premium of founder managers stems from a higher reservation price or higher bargaining 
power when compared to non-founder managers. I am merely suggesting that the 
takeover premium of firms with founder managers in the market for control may differ 
from other counterparts (e.g., non-founder managers, shareholders, potential investors) 
due to these two distinct but potentially interrelated features.  
 Second, I note that there is a important boundary assumption with respect to the 
type of target firms that I consider within my theoretical framework.  Given our focus on 
negotiations between target firms and bidder firms, my predictions do not apply in the 
case of M&A transactions where target firms are not idiosyncratic in nature. If the M&A 
market is a perfect market and every target firm has identical firm which is out in the 
M&A market, target firms will not be able to negotiate for larger economic surplus. In 
this case, target firm with founder manager will not be able to attain higher takeover 
premium than target firm with non-founder manager. 
 Another limitation is the length of the performance measurement. While the study 
examines the short-term market performance of firms that acquire founder-managed 
firms, it does not examine how the acquisition of the founder-managed firm may affect 
the long-term performance of the acquiring firm. Since we still lack knowledge of 
founders’ incentives and behavior after the acquisition of firms, it is difficult to predict 
the potential founder retention effect on the long-term performance of the acquiring 
firms. Thus, more attention should be paid to understanding how founders in the target 
firms may affect post-merger integration and long-term performance (e.g., Capron, 
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1999). A large-scale empirical study that investigates the relationship between actual 
post-acquisition actions and long-term performance of founder-managed firms would be 
promising in future studies.  
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ESSAY TWO:  HOW DO FAMILY OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND 
CONTROL AFFECT R&D INVESTMENT? EVIDENCE FROM FAMILY 
BUSINESS FIRMS IN KOREA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“As in management, strategically deciding when to invest and how much to invest is especially 
critical. However, it is not easy for the ‘professional manager’ to proceed in a timely manner. 
(Omitted) It should be the role of the controlling shareholder to prioritize the potential 
investment opportunities and make investment decisions with a long term perspective.” 
         - Jisung Choi, CEO of Samsung Electronics
18
 
 A growing number of studies show that family business firms are prevalent all 
around the world (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), including the United States (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). For instance, Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very (2007) 
report that family organizations account for over 65 percent of all firms worldwide. 
Anderson & Reeb (2003) reports that family owners control large stakes in about one-
third of S&P 500 firms in the U.S. Recently, there have been ongoing discussions on 
whether family firms are more or less valuable than nonfamily firms (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). However, it is surprising to find that there are only a 
                                                          
18 MK Business News. 2010. Samsung CEO commenting on Kun-Hee Lee’s return to the position of chairman of Samsung 
Electronics (In Korean).  
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few empirical tests on how family ownership shapes a firm's innovation strategy. Such a 
gap in the literature is critical since the effect of corporate governance on the allocation 
of capital towards innovation has been one of the central themes in literature on corporate 
strategy and knowledge of the antecedents of innovation can provide the building blocks 
to understand the mechanisms that may eventually affect the firm's performance. 
 A few recent studies show mixed results of family ownership on innovation, 
suggesting that this is still an open ended question. Morck, Strangeland, & Yeung (2000) 
show that heir-controlled firms invest less in R&D than benchmark non-heir controlled 
firms in Canada. Similarly, Gomez-Mejia, Hoskisson, Makri, Sirmon, & Campbell 
(2010) find that family controlled firms invested less in R&D than non-family controlled 
firms in high tech industry in US.  However, Kim, Kim, & Lee (2008) and Fahlenbrach 
(2009) found the opposite to be true in firms of Korea and U.S. respectively
19
. While 
these previous studies are effective overall in comparing the R&D investment levels 
between family-controlled firms and firms with a dispersed ownership, they do not 
sufficiently consider the heterogeneous characteristics of family firms, e.g., ownership 
structure.  This oversight could be problematic since theoretical predictions of firm 
investment in R&D may vary following different forms of ownership structure. We 
attempt to reconcile the conflicting evidence by positing that, to understand whether and 
when family firms invest in innovation, one must look inside the firm and understand the 
incentives and control power of the family controlling shareholders. Specifically, we 
attempt to disentangle the effects of family ownership, management, and control, which 
                                                          
19
 Even in anecdotal and descriptive findings, the evidence is mixed (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2000; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006).   
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are the key elements of corporate ownership structure with varying influences on the 
firm. 
 
Drawing on arguments of agency theory, corporate governance literature, and 
family business literature, we examine three distinct questions in this paper. First, does 
family ownership increase or decrease a firm’s investment in innovation? Family 
shareholders are concerned with the non-economic value they have in the firm as well as 
the financial returns (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-
Fuentes, 2007).  In particular, family shareholders have a longer investment horizon 
compared to non-family shareholders since they are emotionally attached to the firm and 
have succession plans to continue the family’s legacy, and thus would be more likely to 
invest in long-term investments. However, as the ownership of the family shareholders 
increases, their incentives to derive private benefits rather than invest in innovation will 
increase.  Second, does family management increase or decrease a firm’s investment in 
innovation? Because family management mitigates the traditional agency problem 
between manager and shareholders, traditional agency theory will predict a positive effect 
on R&D investment. However, this effect may be offset by the agency costs of family 
management if the agency costs between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders are larger
20
 (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Third, does family control increase 
or decrease a firm’s investment in innovation? While excessive control over actual cash 
flow rights gives the controlling family stronger monitoring ability to mitigate the 
                                                          
20
 Villalonga & Amit (2006: 387) named this conflict between the controlling shareholder and other small shareholders 
the “Agency Problem II”. Young et al. (2008: 197) called it the “Principal-Principal conflict”.  We use these terms 
interchangeably in this paper.  
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traditional agency problem, at the same time, it gives them incentives and control power 
to expropriate resources from the business for their own private benefits (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997).  
Our study aims to address two issues that are addressed in the literature on 
ownership structure and also family business. First, we attempt to show that investment 
incentives that depend on ownership concentration are subject to decreasing returns, 
indicating that there is a point where an additional stake would discourage investment in 
innovation and increase potential entrenchments. Thus, the effects of family ownership 
on R&D investment may vary depending on the level of family ownership. The 
possibility of entrenchments would create a more nuanced view of family ownership 
concentration. Second, we disentangle the effects of family ownership, family 
management and family control and study how these different components of ownership 
structure affect the strategic investment of a family controlled firm. We argue that one 
must distinguish among the three fundamental elements in the definition of family firms 
to fully understand the effects of ownership structure on strategic investment.  
Our context for the study is the manufacturing industry in Korea from 2001 to 
2008. Korea provides a unique setting for examining the link between family governance 
structure and investment in innovation. In contrast to the US and UK systems of 
corporate governance, but similar to that of many other countries (e.g., Western Europe, 
emerging economies), many Korean firms are run by family members with a large 
concentrated share
21
 (La Porta et al., 1999). Thus, studying firms in Korea can provide 
richer evidence about the effects of family shareholders compared to U.S. data. Also, 
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 A recent study of Lee, Kang & Lee (2010) found that approximately 80% of companies, taken from a  sample of 
manufacturing firms listed on Korea stock exchange, were controlled by family shareholders.  
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similar to firms in most countries (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002), Korean firms 
exhibit far more divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights than do U.S. 
firms; thus we are better able to disentangle the effects of ownership and control, which 
are so difficult to separate in the U.S. data. In sum, the Korean economy encompasses a 
broad spectrum of family controlled firms with different ownership structures, which 
offers a great opportunity to enhance our understanding of how family ownership, 
management, and control may affect firms’ R&D investments. 
In this study, we show that the R&D investments of family controlled firms are 
dependent upon the ownership concentration level of family shareholders. Specifically, 
we find that there is an inverted U relationship between the ownership level of family 
shareholders and R&D investments.  Also, our findings show that family controlled firms 
which have a family member serving as CEO or a member of the board of directors are 
more likely to have a higher level of R&D investment. Third, we find weak support for 
the argument that family controlled firms that use pyramidal control to enhance the 
controlling power of the family are less likely to have higher level of R&D investment.  
Finally, in an additional analysis, we discover that, on average, the R&D investment 
levels of family controlled firms are not significantly different from that of non-family 
controlled firms. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the literatures 
on family controlled firms and then propose the main hypothesis about the relationship 
between ownership structure of the firm and R&D investment. Next, we present the 
empirical settings and results of our analyses. Finally, we conclude with implications and 
directions for future research. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A central premise of a corporate governance study is that the ownership and 
control power of management teams (e.g., CEO, board of directors, top management 
team) and the monitoring power of shareholders may strongly influence management's 
core strategic decisions and the performance of the firm. A firm’s governance structure 
influences its strategic behavior and performance for two reasons. First, shareholders of 
distinct identity (e.g., manager, institutions, government, foreign investors) exert different 
influences on a firm’s performance and behavior because they have different goals and 
incentives (Kim et al., 2008; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). For example, financial 
institutions may be more interested in short-term returns on their investment, while 
corporate investors may be more interested in long-term returns and political or strategic 
goals. Secondly, different levels of ownership concentration in the firm determine the 
owners’ relative power, incentives, and ability to monitor the actions of the firms 
(Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; Rajagopalan, 1997; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). 
 
Studies on Family Business 
 
 Although the traditional agency perspective has offered a compelling theory on 
the ownership structure of firms that have a dispersed ownership structure, this 
perspective may not be applicable to firms that are controlled by families since central 
agency problems in family controlled firms occur between large shareholders (e.g., 
founders, families of founders) and minority shareholders. However, recent studies show 
that family controlled firms are as common among public corporation in U.S. economies 
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(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) and are even more prevalent in other 
economies (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997)  from Western European (e.g., Sweden, Italy) to 
emerging economies in Asia and Latin America (e.g., Korea, Taiwan, India, Chile). The 
unique characteristics of family ownership bring in totally different dynamics in 
corporate governance and agency problems
22
. In this paper, we focus on two distinct 
characteristics of family shareholders: socio-emotional value (non-economical value) and 
large concentrated ownership. While family shareholders value economic returns, unlike 
other shareholders, they also value non-economic concerns that play into creating 
divergent objectives. Thus, a mixture of economic and non-economic concerns will 
impact their preferences regarding firm behavior. For example, selling off a considerable 
part of the family’s ownership stake for economic gain reduces the shares that future 
descendents will inherit, and entails significant emotional costs associated with reduced 
legitimacy, status, authority, social capital, and opportunity to be altruistic to family 
members (Arregle et al., 2007; Casson 1999; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). Thus, 
family shareholders often hope to pass control of the firm to their descendants rather than 
to consume wealth during their lifetime (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).  Also, because a 
family-owned firm provides a distinct self-defining role to its members, family members 
strongly identify with their firm, have strong emotional attachments to the firm, and feel 
responsible for successfully continuing the family legacy (Casson, 1999). Second, family 
shareholders often hold large concentrated ownership stake that provide a significant 
                                                          
22 Recent studies of family business firms indicate that conventional corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., takeover 
market, institutional investors, incentive compensations) that are used to mitigate agency conflicts between managers 
and shareholders are less effective in dealing with conflicts between shareholder groups such as owner-manager and 
minority shareholders (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Kole, 1997; Shivdasani, 1993; Westphal, 
1998).  
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level of control power (Chang, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
2000).  Because family wealth is often closely linked to a firm’s performance, family 
members have substantial incentives to maximize the firm’s value (Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). Also, because of theirconcentrated ownership, they have the power to monitor the 
managers, thereby minimizing the agency problems found in firms with more widely 
dispersed ownership structures (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). However, since family 
shareholders have better access to important information and greater controlling power, 
they may pursue personal gains by leveraging their advantages to the detriment of 
minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000), leading to agency problem 2. Faccio, Lang, 
& Young. (2001) found that without vigilant oversight, founding families are prone to 
exploit minority shareholders’ interests by placing unqualified candidates (e.g., family 
members, friends, and cronies) in key positions while overlooking better qualified 
candidates. Backman (1999) showed that family firms pursue excessive diversification to 
fulfill their personal goal at the expense of the firms’ performance. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
R&D Investment as Managerial Decision 
 
 R&D investment is a long-term strategic investment for management since the 
outcomes of investments are neither immediate nor certain. R&D investment is becoming 
increasingly important for the firms (Badaracco, 1991) since new technology 
development may strongly affect the payoff function and maximize the value of the firm. 
Being reluctant about investing in innovation could impede the growth or even survival 
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of firms competing in highly competitive markets (Gomez-mejia et al., 2010). However, 
it may take many years for the R&D investment to generate a profit (Lee & O'Neil, 
2003). This non-immediate feature of R&D investment complicates  management 
decisions. From the view of agency theory, decisions regarding the magnitude and 
allocation of R&D investments may be a key cause of potential manager-shareholder 
conflicts (Baysinger & Hoskisson., 1990). Previous studies have found that players (e.g., 
shareholders, managers) of different identities (e.g., founder, families of founder, 
institutions) have different expectations, goals, and investment horizons, which may 
affect R&D investments (David, Yoshikawa, Chari, & Rasheed, 2001; Froot, Scharfstein, 
& Stein, 1992; Kim et al., 2008; Lee & O'Neil, 2003).  For example, Kim et al. (2008) 
argues that, in emerging economies, domestic institutional investors tend to be short term 
oriented, which thus may negatively affect R&D investment. In a similar study, Froot et 
al. (1992) asserts that portfolio investors primarily trade stocks using short term 
information, thus causing managers to forgo R&D investment.  
Family Ownership on R&D Investment 
 
Families, as committed shareholders with a long-term and sustainable presence in 
the firm, possess strong incentives to invest in projects that ensure the long-term viability 
and health of the firm. Since the family has non-economic and more intrinsic interests 
(Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010), preservation of family identity 
in the firm is often valued over short term financial return.  The long-term and continuing 
commitment of family owners towards their firms potentially gives rise to a long-horizon 
perspective that leads to capital allocation decisions that increase long-term investment. 
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While professional managers prefer investment in short-term projects since the stock 
market fails to properly reward long-term investments and compensation is tied to short-
term earnings (Healy, 1985; Holmstrom, 1999; Porterba & Summers, 1995), family 
shareholders, who have strong incentives and control power to influence the firm’s 
investment decisions, will try to provide discipline for management to commit resources 
to long-term investments.  Hence, as family members increase their controlling power by 
obtaining a higher ownership stake, they will gain more discretion to enforce investment 
in long term projects.  
At certain levels of equity ownership, however, the private benefits of controlling 
shareholders may outweigh the loss suffered from the firm’s reduced value, both 
economic and non-economic, resulting from the pursuit of personal interests (Short & 
Keasey, 1999). This includes the potential loss faced by the firm for opting out of long 
term investments. For example, taking advantage of their controlling power, family 
owners may receive extraordinary dividends at the expense of investments in capital 
equipment (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2000). This view is similar to the argument that high 
levels of managerial ownership could lead to ‘entrenchment’, as external shareholders 
find it difficult to control the actions of such managers (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1988). That is, while managers try to maximize firm value, once they reach a certain level 
of ownership, managers may enjoy consuming perquisites which reduce the firm’s value. 
Not only will they have the incentives to do so; they will also have enough control power 
to pursue their own personal agenda without fear of monitoring activities by other 
shareholders. This entrenchment view implies that family members will be more likely to 
pursue private benefits as the ownership concentration of the controlling family reaches a 
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certain level. Thus, as the controlling family increases their ownership of the firm above a 
certain level, they will become less likely to invest in long term investments such as 
R&D, and more likely to pursue private gains that provide immediate benefits to family 
members. Thus, it is likely that the effects of family ownership on R&D investment may 
vary depending on the level of family ownership. The combination of the long term 
investment horizon argument and the entrenchment argument points toward a non-linear 
relation between family ownership and R&D investment. Thus, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Among family controlled firms, the concentration of ownership in 
the hands of family members will have a curvilinear (inverted U-shape) 
relationship with R&D investment. 
 
Family Management on R&D Investment 
 
In this section, we analyze how family management affects the R&D investment 
of the firm. Traditional manager-shareholder agency theory suggests that professional 
manager and shareholders often have conflict of interests. Studies related to R&D 
investment show that professional managers have a short-term focus that leads to 
investment decisions which may not be optimal for shareholders (Holmstrom, 1999). 
This preference for short-term projects among professional managers can be attributed, in 
part, to the potential risks that longer term projects carry, which could impact CEO 
compensation and job security (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Murphy, 1999). Due to the 
high information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, which is characteristic 
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of R&D projects, the current stock prices often do not fully reflect the true future benefits 
of R&D spending (Lev & Sougiannis, 1996).  For example, Porterba & Summers (1995) 
find that managers favor short-term over long-term projects due to the belief that stock 
market prices fail to properly reflect long-term investments. However, studies on family 
business argue that family management may mitigate the manager-shareholder agency 
problem, and thus create greater value for the firm when compared to professional 
management (Morck et al., 1988; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Extending this view, we 
argue that family management will be positively related to R&D investment for the 
following two reasons. First, through the family’s presence on the board and/or in top 
management positions, which guarantees access to critical information, information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders is mitigated, and thus R&D investment 
has no negative impact on CEO compensation and job security. Second, and more 
fundamentally, the family’s strong influence on the firm can enhance the family 
management’s control power over important managerial decisions, such as the allocation 
of capital, without undermining job security (Morck et al., 1988).  Combining the 
findings that family management mitigates information asymmetry and that is backed up 
by the high control power of family shareholders, we argue that family management will 
be more likely to invest in R&D investment than professional managers. Thus, we 
propose: 
Hypothesis 2. Among family controlled firms, firms that have family members on 
board or in top management team will be more likely to have higher levels of 
R&D investment. 
 
71 
 
 
Family Control on R&D Investment 
 
In this section, we analyze how the governance mechanisms used by families to 
enhance control of their firms over and above their sheer ownership stake affect the R&D 
investment of the firm. The gap between control rights and cash-flow rights created by a 
control enhancing mechanism can manifest itself in a wide range of corporate decisions–
–the choice of investment projects, the investment scale of projects, a firm’s size and 
scope––and can ultimately affect a firm’s value (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Chang 
(2003), Claessens et al. (2000) and La Porta et al. (1999), show that controlling 
shareholders, many of whom are families of the founders, often have substantial power in 
excess of their cash-flow rights through pyramidal ownership structures
23
. Villalonga & 
Amit (2006; 2009) show that firms in the United States often use dual class shares to 
enhance their control power.  
While excessive control over actual cash flow rights gives the controlling family a 
stronger monitoring ability to mitigate the traditional agency problem, it creates an 
opportunity for a bigger agency problem between family shareholders and other 
shareholders. Previous studies on discrepancy in cash flow rights and voting rights 
highlight the magnitude of the agency problems between the controlling family and other 
minority shareholders. For example, it gives the controlling family substantial power over 
important strategic decisions while enabling them to avoid the full cost of any negative 
outcomes (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Controlling families can pay themselves special 
                                                          
23 Previous studies of control enhancing mechanisms (e.g., Chang, 2003; Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999) show that 
controlling shareholders use dual-class stock, pyramidal ownership structures, cross-holdings and circular holdings to gain excessive 
control power in the firm. However, we focus on circular holdings, a certain type of pyramidal ownership, which is more prevalent 
than other control mechanisms throughout the world (Morck ,Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005), and dual class holdings which are also 
more prevalent in the context of Korea. 
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dividends or exploit other business relationships with the companies they control, 
generating private benefits for themselves. 
A pyramidal ownership structure enhances control by creating a wedge between 
the percentage of votes owned and the percentage of votes controlled. Thus, pyramidal 
control gives the controlling family excessive control of the firm such that they can exert 
strong influence over the firm’s decisions while limiting the risks to their cash flow 
rights. In the case of the Hyundai Group, while the controlling family owns only 6.62 
percent of the cash-flow rights of Hyundai Motors, using a circular ownership structure 
through Hyundai Mobis and Hyundai Steel, the family controls 37.05 percent of the 
voting rights of the company (see Figure 6 for an example of the Hyundai Motor business 
group). The controlling family has 30.43 percent excess control, but their risk is limited 
to their 6.62 percent level of ownership. Thus, following the above argument on 
excessive control rights, we propose:  
Hypothesis 3a. Among family controlled firms, firms that use a control pyramid 
will be more likely to have a lower level of R&D investment. 
Families also use dual class stocks to enhance their control over cash flow rights 
(Nenova, 2001). Dual class stocks can entitle their holders, often families, to a different 
number of votes per share; and holding relatively more shares of the superior voting class 
is what creates a disparity between the controlling owners’ cash flow and control rights 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2009). Thus, following the above argument on excessive control 
rights, we propose:  
Hypothesis 3b. Among family controlled firms, firms that use dual class stocks 
will be more likely to have a lower level of R&D investment. 
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Figure 6: The ownership structure of the Hyundai Motor Group 
a,b,c,d
 
 
a
We show equity ownership of affiliates that are more than 0.5 trillion won in assets as of 2008 
b
Dark circle for companies with more than 10 trillion won in assets. Dark arrow represents circular shareholding through equity investment 
c
Companies in bold face are listed in the Stock Market Division of Korean Exchange 
d
Sources: Korea Investor’s Service
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Context 
 
For this study, we use data from the Korean stock market from 2001 to 2008. 
Korea offers a unique setting for examining the link between governance structure and 
behavior of family controlled firms. First, compared to the U.S. and U.K. economies, the 
Korean economy provides a context where the family business paradigm is more 
prevalent, as in emerging economies and Western Europe. This brings in totally different 
dynamics in corporate governance and agency problems. Due to the unique 
characteristics of family controlled firms, the traditional agency problems between 
shareholders and managers may be supplanted by problems between the controlling 
families and minority shareholders. Recent studies of family business firms indicate that 
conventional corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., takeover market, institutional 
investors, incentive based compensation) that are used to mitigate agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders are less effective in dealing with conflicts between 
shareholder groups such as owner-manager and minority shareholders (Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Kole, 1997; Shivdasani, 1993; 
Westphal, 1998). Korea provides an interesting context to understand how corporate 
governance mechanism may affect the agency problem in economies different from the 
U.S. Second, Korea offers a setting where control pyramids, in which tiers of listed firms 
hold control blocks in other listed firms, are commonplace. While control pyramids rarely 
exist in the U.S. economy, they are widely used by families all over the world (La Porta 
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et al., 1999; Villalonga & Amit, 2009). Thus, it is important to understand how the 
control pyramids may affect the decisions of the controlling family.  
We have chosen to examine a period after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 to 
distinguish the effects of business groups from the effects of an underdeveloped corporate 
governance system. It is widely understood that Korea’s poor corporate governance 
system helped fuel the financial crisis in 1997 (Joh, 2003). Thus, for studies that use data 
predating 1997, it is difficult to tease out the influence of business groups from the 
influence of a poor corporate governance system. Since the outbreak of the crisis, 
however, Korean firms have worked to build legitimate corporate governance systems in 
response to fortified government regulations and the need for greater credibility with 
foreign shareholders. For example, the investment ceiling in shareholding volume for 
foreign investors in the Korean stock market was removed, business groups were advised 
to create holding companies by the government, and regulation was formed to require a 
certain proportion of outside investors. These series of structural reformations have 
enhanced corporate governance to a decent level which, in turn, have positively affected 
firm performance (Choi, Park, & Yoo, 2007). Thus, by choosing the time period from 
2001 to 2008, we can examine the effect of business groups in a relatively developed 
corporate governance system. 
 
Data 
 
The primary source of data for this study is a database maintained by the Korea 
Information Service (KIS), a major credit-rating agency in Korea that offers ownership 
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data as well as company profiles and financial information on all Korean public firms 
since the early 1980s (Chang & Hong, 2000). We collected all quantitative data and 
ownership information for sample companies from the KIS database. For our initial 
sample, we obtained information on all manufacturing firms listed on the Korea Stock 
Exchange from 2001 to 2008.   We controlled for survivorship bias by allowing for firm 
exits from our sample during the targeted period (unbalanced panel).  
This initial dataset contains 568 firms in the manufacturing industry. A primary 
issue in using firm-level investment data, particularly R&D expenditures, is that firms 
sometimes do not report R&D expenses, which then become coded into the KIS database 
as missing
24
. Of our 568 firm observations, KISDATA provided R&D data for 524 
observations
25
. To supplement the firm ownership data, we manually collected data from 
corporate proxy statements from 2001 through 2008 on ownership structure, including 
ownership levels, ownership identity, and pyramidal holdings. Finally, this data is 
supplemented with information from the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) database 
and public sources (e.g., corporation websites, brochures, various FSS filings, business 
articles and web searches). Other missing data further reduced firm observations to 515. 
Lastly, our models contain a one-year lag between the measurements of predictors and 
dependent variables. Thus, our final dataset sample consists of 464 firm observations and 
2,474 firm-year observations. 
                                                          
24 This missing data is not unique to Korea’s setting (or the KIS database). Hall (1993) states that even in the U.S., 
firms (or COMPUSTAT) sometimes do not report the magnitude of R&D investments.  
25
 To make sure our results are impacted by the missing data on R&D investment and control for any potential effects 
of the missing R&D investment data, we perform robustness check by including a dummy variable “R&D not reported”. 
All of our results (available upon request) remain substantively unchanged.  
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Variables 
 
Dependent Variable.  This study investigates the effect of governance structure on 
strategic decisions made by family controlled firms. Among the various aspects of 
strategic investment decisions, we focus on the R&D investment of a firm for two 
reasons. First, R&D investment is becoming increasingly important for manufacturing 
firms since new technology development may strongly affect the payoff function and 
maximize the value of the firm (Badaracco, 1991). Second, Kothari, Laguerre, & Leone 
(2002) indicate that R&D spending has a substantial impact on firm risk when compared 
to other expenditures, suggesting that it should be factored into the decisions of large 
shareholders and managers. These two distinct features of R&D investment allow us to 
examine interesting dynamics between different players in the firm, e.g., shareholders, 
managers, founder, families of founder, institutions. Building on previous studies related 
to R&D investment (e.g., Greve, 2003; Kim et al., 2008; Lee & O’Neill, 2003), we define 
the dependent variable as R&D intensity, measured as the ratio of R&D expenditures to 
total sales of the focal firm.  
Independent Variables.  Our independent variables are collected through two distinct 
phases. In the first stage, we define family controlled firm. While previous studies have 
used many different definitions to define family controlled firms, we use a more 
conservative definition by using a 20 percent threshold
26
. Thus, in our main model, we 
define family controlled firm as a firm where families hold over 20 percent of voting 
                                                          
26
 While the magnitude of the threshold is arbitrary, a 20 percent threshold meets the minimum control threshold 
imposed by SEC reporting requirements.  
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shares. For a sensitivity analysis, we examine our model using a more widely accepted 
definition, that is, firms where more than 20% of voting shares are owned by individuals 
or companies that are controlled by those individuals using pyramidal control. 
In the second stage, we define family ownership concentration level, family 
management, and family control, respectively, following the definitions described below.  
Family ownership is the sum of equity ownership held by controlling family members, 
including founders, wives and descendants. Family management is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for firms of which at least one of the controlling family members is in the top 
management team or on the board of directors. The lists of top management team and 
board of directors are attained from annual reports. To test for the effect of family 
control, we generate two different proxies, pyramidal control and dual-class stocks. 
Pyramidal control dummy is a dummy that equals 1 for firms that use pyramidal control, 
including cross holdings and circular holdings. We also use continuous value of 
pyramidal control as a robustness check. Pyramidal control continuous is defined as the 
sum of equity held by firms and financial institutions that belong to the same business 
group, following Kim et al., (2008).  Dual- class stocks dummy is a dummy that equals 1 
for firms that have dual-class shares with differential voting rights.  
 
Control Variables.  We also use a number of controls that are found to be significant in 
R&D investments according to previous research. It is possible that the influence of 
business group affiliation on R&D investment may not be identical among business 
groups of diverse sizes, since large Korean business groups are found to be different from 
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small and medium-sized groups in various aspects (e.g., profitability, financial slack, 
growth rate, and investment in CAPEX) (Choo, Lee, Ryu, & Yoon, 2009; Kim et al., 
2008). Thus, we add the variable large business group dummy, which equals 1 for firms 
that fall under the category of ‘large business group’ in order to find out whether there is 
a systematic difference in terms of R&D investment depending on company size. The 
KFTC annually designates companies that fall into ‘large business group’ category, 
which includes firms with more than 2 trillion won in total assets, and therefore subject to 
stricter regulations (e.g., ceiling on the total amount of equity investment and restriction 
on cross-shareholding)
27
. We put firms into the large business group category by using 
the annual lists published by the KFTC. Based on the two-digit Korean Standard 
Industrial Classification (KSIC) codes, we identify industries including chemicals (KSIC 
Codes 20 to 22), machinery (KSIC Codes 29 to 31), and electronics (KSIC Codes 26 to 
29) (Kim et al., 2008). Then, we include the R&D intensive dummy, which equals 1 for 
firms belonging to these industries, in order to tease out the effect of R&D-intensive 
industries. Foreigner equity is measured as the percentage of common equity held by 
foreign investors at the end of each year. We include this variable since foreign 
ownership level has been found to influence investment in R&D activity (Bushee, 1998; 
David et al., 2006). Furthermore, we include leverage ratio, measured as the book value 
of debt divided by total equity. We also add firm performance, measured as the operating 
income on total assets (ROA) of the focal firm, and firm size, which is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s net sales of a firm. Finally, we include eight calendar-year 
                                                          
27 Annually from 2001 to 2008, the KFTC annually published the list of large business groups with more than 2 trillion 
won in assets and put on limitation of assurance for a period of time. However, in 2008, the revision of the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act raised the bar up to 5 trillion won. To maintain compatibility, we applied  2 trillion won 
criteria to the entire sample period. 
80 
 
 
dummies to control for possible year effects and two-digit Korean Standard Industrial 
Classification industry dummies to control for possible industry effects.  
 
Analysis 
 
To test our hypotheses, we used firm fixed effects regression, which allows us to 
control for time invariant unobservable firm dimensions that are not explicitly controlled 
in our regression. Failure to control for such effects can significantly bias regression 
estimates (Heckman, 1981). We performed a Hausman test which shows that the 
estimated panel error is correlated with independent variables, violating an assumption 
necessary for the use of a random-effects model. This validates our use of fixed effects 
regression. Nevertheless, we supplement the test of our hypotheses by additionally using 
a random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression (Wooldridge, 2002). All of 
our results (available upon request) remain substantively unchanged.  The entire 
individual variable VIF values were below 2.2, and the mean VIF was below 1.5 for all 
models, which is well below the recommended cutoff of 10, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a concern
28
. Finally, we control for serial correlation by including 
yearly dummy variables and a previous year R&D intensity variable. 
Results 
Table 12 presents summary statistics and a correlation matrix of the firms in our 
sample, including family controlled firms and non-family controlled firms. 
                                                          
28
 We ran a VIF test without the family ownership square value which obviously will be highly correlated with the 
family ownership value.  However, when we ran a VIF test with family ownership square value, mean VIF was below 
3.5 which is also well below the recommended cutoff of 10.  
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Table 12:  Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix (Full Sample) 
    Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 
R&D intensity 
(T1) 
1.818 8.809 1.000                           
2 
Family Equity 
Portion  
20.813 17.884 -0.043 1.000                         
3 
(Family Equity 
Portion)^ 
752.947 
957.22
3 
-0.037 0.937 1.000                       
4 
CEO Or 
Chairman 
Presence 
0.779 0.415 -0.024 0.522 0.364 1.000                     
5 
Dual Class Share 
Stock 
0.196 0.397 0.007 -0.196 -0.193 -0.112 1.000                   
6 
Pyramidal 
Control Dummy 
0.687 0.464 0.002 -0.373 -0.281 -0.275 0.063 1.000                 
7 
Control Enhanced 
by Pyramidal 
Control 
16.654 19.163 -0.018 -0.589 -0.463 -0.384 0.052 0.575 1.000               
8 
Large Group 
Control 
0.176 0.381 0.016 -0.272 -0.227 -0.117 0.243 0.233 0.286 1.000             
9 
Firm Size 
(LnSales) 
25.872 1.523 -0.004 -0.258 -0.218 -0.110 0.281 0.251 0.231 0.617 1.000           
10 ROA 3.876 9.333 -0.021 0.092 0.069 0.096 0.036 -0.004 -0.009 0.096 0.308 1.000         
11 Leverage Ratio 1.534 11.974 0.001 -0.090 -0.069 -0.097 0.003 0.039 0.037 -0.016 -0.036 -0.124 1.000       
12 Foreigner Equity 8.931 14.324 0.012 -0.249 -0.220 -0.179 0.177 0.160 0.191 0.285 0.518 0.249 -0.054 1.000     
13 
R&D Intensive 
Industry 
0.505 0.500 0.060 0.006 0.018 0.013 -0.058 -0.023 -0.036 0.061 0.023 -0.103 0.017 0.040 1.000   
14 
R&D intensity 
(T0) 
1.753 8.175 0.103 -0.039 -0.034 -0.024 0.011 0.002 -0.010 0.013 -0.077 -0.041 -0.007 0.015 0.065 1.000 
* Matrix includes all family controlled firms and non-family controlled firms 
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Table 13 reports the results from the firm fixed regression model for R&D intensity for a 
sub-sample that includes family controlled firms only. Model 1 is our baseline model for the 
firms’ intensity to invest in R&D.  Regarding these control variables, performance (ROA), R&D 
intensity of the previous year, and firm size have statistically significant relationships with R&D 
intensity of the current year. The coefficients of the control variables suggest that firms that (1) 
are less profitable, (2) have invested more in R&D, and (3) are larger in size tend to invest more 
in R&D.  
Models 2 and 3 allow us to test our predictions without controlling for the previous year’s 
R&D investments, and Models 4 and 5 allow us to test our predictions with the previous year’s 
R&D investments, which controls for autocorrelation issues. Models 2 and 4 use dummy 
variables for pyramidal control to test H3a. Models 3 and 5 use continuous variables for 
pyramidal control to test H3a. Models 2 to 5 all provide substantially similar findings suggesting 
that our results are consistent and stable. To explain our results, we use Model 4 which treats all 
independent and control variables of our interests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
83 
 
 
 
Table 13: Fixed Effect Regression for R&D Intensity (Family Controlled Firms) 
VARIABLES Hs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Family Ownership     0.0671** 0.0747** 0.0743** 0.0833*** 
      (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
(Family Ownership)^ H1   
-
0.000814** 
-
0.000881** 
-
0.000851** 
-
0.000933** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Family Management H2   0.445* 0.460* 0.443* 0.459* 
      (0.247) (0.247) (0.256) (0.256) 
Pyramidal Control 
Dummy 
H3a   -0.176   -0.175   
      (0.120)   (0.122)   
Pyramidal Control 
Continuous 
H3a     0.00527   0.00728 
        (0.008)   (0.008) 
Dual-Class Stock H3b   0.344 0.367 0.307 0.335 
      (0.400) (0.401) (0.400) (0.400) 
Large Group Control   -0.097 -0.0265 -0.0354 -0.018 -0.033 
    (0.241) (0.243) (0.245) (0.244) (0.245) 
Firm Size (LnSales)   0.122 0.166 0.16 0.252** 0.249** 
    (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) 
ROA   -0.0248*** -0.0245*** -0.0250*** -0.0196*** -0.0202*** 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Leverage Ratio   -0.0377 -0.0414 -0.0384 -0.0437 -0.0408 
    (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Foreigner Equity   -0.000657 -0.00175 -0.00228 -0.00193 -0.0025 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
R&D Intensive Industry   -0.049 -0.0921 -0.08 -1.72 -0.071 
    (0.944) (0.941) (0.941) (1.049) (0.952) 
R&D Intensity (t0)         0.210*** 0.210*** 
          (0.037) (0.037) 
Year Dummy   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant   -1.589 -4.703 -4.868 -6.686** -7.245** 
    (2.9580) (3.1540) (3.1750) (3.1070) (3.1610) 
Observations   1312 1312 1312 1253 1253 
R-squared   0.03 0.041 0.04 0.074 0.073 
Number of stock   265 265 265 252 252 
a
 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Hypothesis 1 argued that the concentration of ownership in the hands of family members 
would have a curvilinear relationship with R&D investment. In Model 4 of Table 13, the 
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coefficient of the family ownership concentration square value shows a negative and significant 
relationship, which provides support for Hypothesis 1. Our results suggest that the relationship 
between family ownership and R&D investment is not uniform over the entire range of family 
ownership. Rather, R&D investment increases until family ownership reaches a certain point, 
and beyond this level, R&D investment begins to decline. We look at this relationship in more 
details in the next section.  
Hypothesis 2 argued that firms that have a family member on board or on the top 
management team would be more likely to have higher levels of R&D investment than non-
family controlled firms. In Model 4 of Table 13, the coefficient of the family management 
dummy shows a positive and significant relationship, which provides support for Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3a argued that firms that use a control pyramid would be more likely to have a lower 
level of R&D investment than those that do not. In Model 4 of Table 14, the coefficient of the 
pyramidal control dummy variable is negative, but not significant.  
Hypothesis 3b argued that firms that use dual class stock would be more likely to have lower 
levels of R&D investment than those that do not. In Model 4 of Table 14, the coefficient of the 
dual class stock dummy variable is positive, but not significant.  
As a sensitivity check, we report results from the firm fixed regression model for the 
R&D intensity in Table 14, by using a subsample of firms with more than 20% voting shares 
owned by individuals or companies that are controlled by those using pyramidal control. 
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Table 14:  Sensitivity Check using Fixed Effect Regression for R&D Intensity 
VARIABLES Hs 
Expected 
Sign 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Family Ownership       0.0157 -0.00628 
        (0.017) (0.019) 
(Family Ownership)^ H1 -   -0.000272 -0.000352 
        (0.000) (0.000) 
Family Management H2 +   0.354* 0.344* 
        (0.196) (0.195) 
Pyramidal Control Dummy H3a -   -0.249   
        (0.206)   
Pyramidal Control 
Continuous 
H3a -     
-
0.0176*** 
          (0.007) 
Dual-Class Stock H3b -   0.822 0.74 
        (0.541) (0.541) 
Large Group Control     0.155 0.163 0.176 
      (0.212) (0.212) (0.211) 
Firm Size (LnSales)     -0.286* -0.272* -0.270* 
      (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) 
ROA     -0.00669 -0.00762 -0.00718 
      (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Leverage Ratio     0.0261*** 0.0261*** 0.0265*** 
      (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Foreigner Equity     0.00531 0.00569 0.00513 
      (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
R&D Intensive Industry     -0.448 -3.891* -0.408 
      (2.182) (2.180) (2.175) 
R&D Intensity (t0)           
            
Year Dummy     Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy     Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy 
  
Yes Yes Yes 
Constant     8.712** 10.37** 8.287* 
      (4.270) (4.116) (4.298) 
Observations     2246 2246 2246 
R-squared     0.054 0.059 0.062 
Number of stock     443 443 443 
a
 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
While all results are identical in their predicted directions, there are a couple of changes 
in degree of significance that need to be mentioned. The relationship between ownership 
86 
 
 
concentration level and R&D investment shows a negative curvilinear relationship (see Model 6 
and 7), but is not significant. However, interestingly, in Model 7, we find that the coefficient of 
the pyramidal control continuous variable is positive, and strongly significant, suggesting that 
firms that use a control pyramid will be more likely to have a lower level of R&D investment 
than others. The effects of family management on R&D investment were positive and 
significant.  
Additional Analysis  
 
Although in Table 13 our main model on square value of ownership concentration 
contains a negative coefficient, we can only conclude that there are decreasing returns from a 
negative and significant squared term, since the downward bend of the curve may not be 
statistically significant. In order to investigate this issue, we performed two additional test. First 
we estimated a model where we replace ownership concentration variables with a set of 
dummies, setting the benchmark dummy at one, when ownership concentration level takes a 
value between 20–25% ; and at 0 otherwise. In a similar fashion, we created dummies for the 
following ranges: 25-30%, 30-35%, 35–40%, 40–45%, 45–50%, 50-60%, 60-70%, and 70-
100%. The results of this exercise, reported in Model 10 of Table 15, show that dummy for the 
value 25-30 % and 30-35%  are significant and positive. Interestingly, this finding shows that the 
coefficient value of  dummies tend to increase till the inflection point (e.g., 25~30% ) , and tend 
to decrease as the dummies gets farther from the inflection point, indicating evidence that 
ownership concentration level may have an inverted U shape relationship with R&D investment.  
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Table 15: Fixed Effect Regression for R&D Intensity (Family Controlled Firms) 
 
VARIABLES Model 9 Model 10 
      
Family Ownership 25~30%   0.290** 
    (0.139) 
Family Ownership 30~35%   0.259* 
    (0.154) 
Family Ownership 35~40%   0.263 
    (0.178) 
Family Ownership 40~45%   0.225 
    (0.186) 
Family Ownership 45~50%   0.233 
    (0.206) 
Family Ownership 50~60%   0.194 
    (0.243) 
Family Ownership 60~70%   0.0558 
    (0.469) 
Family Ownership above 70%   -0.0487 
    (0.729) 
Family Management 0.487* 0.456* 
  (0.256) (0.259) 
Dual-Class Stock 0.255 0.285 
  (0.400) (0.403) 
Pyramidal Control Continuous -0.175 -0.166 
  (0.121) (0.123) 
Constant -5.896* -5.915* 
  (3.134) (3.234) 
All Other Controls Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes Yes 
Observations 1,277 1,277 
R-squared 0.073 0.078 
Number of stock 265 265 
a
 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Our baseline category of family ownership is family ownership of 20~25%
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Secondly, we also perform qualitative test by plotting family ownership with R&D 
intensity. Figure 7 shows a scatter plot for R&D intensity versus family ownership. Left  
figure shows scatter plot with predicted values of R&D intensity dependent on family 
ownership and right figure only shows the predicted value of R&D intensity dependent 
on family ownership. In this figure, we clearly see an inverted U shape estimated slop 
which supports our main results.  
 
Figure 7:Family Ownership and R&D Intensity 
 
 
Additionally, we test whether, on average, family-controlled firms invest more (or 
less) in R&D than their non–family-controlled counterparts. In table 16, we show that the 
coefficient of the family-controlled dummy is negative but insignificant, suggesting that 
on average there is no relationship between family control and R&D investment. A valid 
concern is whether the failure to find statistically significant results means there are no 
such effects or the effects exist, but the standard error of our coefficient in model 11 of 
table 16 are so large as to obscure them. The validity of this concern is reduced by the 
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fact that we use large samples and that we were able to find consistent effects for our 
prediction regarding family ownership and management.  
Table 16:  Fixed Effect Regression for R&D Intensity (Full Sample) 
 
VARIABLES Model 11 
Family Controlled Firms -0.0552 
  (0.882) 
Large Group Control 0.589 
  (1.146) 
Firm Size (LnSales) 0.36 
  (0.636) 
ROA -0.0264 
  (0.032) 
Leverage Ratio -0.00597 
  (0.037) 
Foreigner Equity -0.0394 
  (0.032) 
R&D Intensive Industry 3.071 
  (6.410) 
R&D Intensity (t0) -0.131*** 
  (0.024) 
Constant -9.341 
  (18.760) 
Industry Dummy Yes 
Year Dummy Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes 
Observations 2480 
Number of stock 436 
R-squared 0.024 
a
 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Robustness Checks 
 
Because our data was panelized and the dependent variables were limited, that is, 
they could not take a negative value and contained numerous observations with values 
equal to 0, a tobit panel data methodology was performed in additional to our main 
regression. Specifically, we employed tobit random effect models using industry at the 2-
digit KSIC level as the group variable in order to control for any industry-related variance. 
However, the tobit panel data methodology has a significant shortcoming in that it cannot 
employ a fixed effect model.
29
 Thus, we ran the tobit random effect models only as a 
robustness check for our primary analyses (available upon request). The results of these 
analyses were substantively unchanged from those reported. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Firms are increasingly depending on innovation for their long term performance. 
However, little is known about the relationship between investment in innovation and 
family controlled firms, even though family controlled firms are prevalent all around the 
world. While recent studies have started to highlight family controlled firms’ innovation 
strategies, they cannot fully explain why innovation strategies vary between family 
controlled firms. In this paper, we have argued that publicly traded family controlled 
manufacturing firms tend to invest more in R&D when families have a higher ownership 
stake; however, after a certain level of ownership, this tendency starts to decline, showing 
                                                          
29
 Stata10 notes that a conditional-effect model is inaccessible, as there does not exist a sufficient statistic allowing the 
fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood (Stata10, 2007: 455). Also, while unconditional fixed effects may 
be estimated, care must be taken with this approach because unconditional fixed-effects estimates are biased (Stata10, 
2007: 455). 
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a curvilinear relationship between family ownership level and R&D investment. More 
specifically, using a set of family ownership dummies, we find that the curvilinear 
relationship is likely to have an inverted U shape form, having its inflection point at 
30~35% ownership level.  We have also argued, and our empirical results support, that 
publicly traded family controlled manufacturing firms tend to invest more in R&D when 
there is a family presence in the firm’s management. Lastly, when we enlarge the 
subsample to include firms with more than 20% voting shares owned by individuals or 
companies controlled by those individuals using pyramidal control, we find that family 
controlled firms tend to invest less in R&D when families use a control pyramid to 
enhance their control. In sum, our findings suggest that overlooking the role of 
governance structure may result in an incomplete understanding about family 
shareholders’ influence on R&D investment.   
We make a few contributions in this paper. First, we contribute to corporate 
governance literature by delving into how different principals may vary in their 
preferences on the risks and rewards of R&D investment. By looking at one particular 
type of shareholder, the family, we specifically focus on the role that economic and 
noneconomic concerns play in creating divergent preferences, and the factors that 
influence the controlling shareholders’ preferences towards the firm’s innovation 
strategy. We also extend the literature by showing how an agency relation within family 
controlled firms affects the strategic decision of a firm. Although studies in corporate 
governance have offered compelling theories on ownership structures of firms with 
widely dispersed ownership, researchers have yet to come up with compelling theories of 
ownership structures of firms largely owned by the families of the founders (Villalonga 
92 
 
 
& Amit, 2006). By distinguishing the incentive and entrenchment effects of family 
ownership, we show that while family shareholders pursue long term investment, at a 
certain point of ownership they may take advantage of their superior control power to 
earn private benefits.      
We also shed light on research in family business by looking at how various 
components of ownership structures affect the strategic investment of a family controlled 
firm. We specifically argue that one must distinguish among three fundamental elements 
in the definition of family firms, namely, ownership, management and control, to fully 
understand the effects of ownership structure on strategic investment. To our knowledge, 
our study is one of the first large-data empirical studies that investigate these 
relationships.  
Third, we contribute to the literature on innovation by echoing previous studies 
that a firm’s corporate governance modes have significant effects on its decision to invest 
in an innovation. Specifically, we extend the literature by testing the effects of corporate 
governance on R&D investment in a new set of firms, that is, family controlled firms, in 
which conventional corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., takeover market, 
institutional investors, incentive compensations) are less effective (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2003; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Kole, 1997; Shivdasani, 1993; Westphal, 1998).  
Lastly, while most recent empirical studies on family business use U.S. based data 
(e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; 2009), further family business 
studies using data from other countries are needed since  family controlled firms are less 
prevalent in the U.S. compared to other economies (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Schulze et 
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al., 2003) and exceptional for its almost complete absence of control pyramids, which are 
widely used by families all over the world (La Porta et al., 1999; Villalonga & Amit, 
2009). Thus, by using data from a context where family business and control pyramids 
are more commonplace, we fill this empirical gap in the literature.  
Our study has several limitations. First, we focused on Korean firms for our 
hypothesis testing, and therefore our results may have limited generalizability. However, 
the Korean context provides various types of family controlled firms with a wide 
spectrum of ownership structure, offering an ideal context to test our hypotheses. Despite 
possible limitations in generalizability, our focus builds on many previous studies on 
Korean family business and business groups which examine the relationship between 
family ownership and firm value and performance (Bae, Cheon, & Kang, 2008; Bae, 
Kang, & Kim, 2002; Baek, Kang, & Park, 2004; Chang, 2003; Chang & Hong, 2000). 
Still, replicating the study with firms from other emerging economies or more developed 
economies would help unveil the effects of family firms on innovation.  
   Another important caveat of this study is that we are not implying a 
correspondence between a firm’s R&D investment and its performance outcome. We are 
merely suggesting that there is a correspondence between a firm’s ownership structure 
and its propensity to invest in innovations. Hence, we make no claims that in our context, 
any specific choices of ownership, management, and control are a superior form of 
governance.  Future studies will benefit from examining how the ownership structure of 
family controlled firms relates to innovation outcomes such as patents or new products.  
Lastly, our study has focused on relatively large and old firms. In newer, faster 
growing firms, family holdings may have a more important effect on firm’s decisions. 
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For example, founder families in younger firms might have an important leadership role 
to play. Research on family controlled firm structure would undoubtedly benefit from 
considering smaller firms as well.  
In conclusion, our study explores how governance choices – ownership 
concentration level, management, and control mechanisms -affect a firm’s investment in 
innovation. We address the theoretical issues by focusing on one particular type of 
shareholder, the family, who are understudied in the literature but prevalent all over the 
world. We contribute to the literature on corporate governance and family business by 
considering how the ownership identity of a firm and its governance choices shape firm 
behavior within the competitive environment. We hope that our results would encourage 
scholars to extend research on corporate governance to explore the link between 
ownership structure and competitive behavior, and to consider such choices in the context 
of family controlled firms. 
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ESSAY3: INFLUENCE OF FAMILY-CONTROL AND BUSINESS GROUP 
AFFILIATION ON FIRM R&D INVESTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM KOREAN 
FIRMS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Strategy and economics scholars have long been intrigued by the question of how 
the business group affiliation influences corporate action (see Morck, Wolfenzon, & 
Yeung (2005) for a recent review of the literature). Recently, a growing body of studies 
on family business complements the business group literature, inasmuch as many family-
controlled firms are business groups at the same time (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Orrú, 
Biggart, & Hamilton, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
However, the high level of overlap between business group firms and family-controlled 
firms caused a problem in empirical research; Many previous studies have erroneously 
attributed a phenomenon to business group affiliation when it should have been attributed 
to family control and vice versa (Choi, Park, & Yoo, 2007). We believe that the lack of 
clear conceptual as well as empirical separation of business group affiliation and family 
control in the empirical literature is partially responsible for mixed, inconclusive findings 
about the effects of the two properties (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Bae, Kang, & Kim, 
2002; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Perez-Gonzales, 2006).
30
 
In addition, while previous studies have focused on the financial performance 
implications of business group affiliation and family control (see Khanna & Yafeh (2007) 
                                                          
30 While the term “business group” is used in the literature to refer to various types of corporate groupings such as 
those in which the member firms are tied together by family membership, common ethnicity of the owners, 
interlocking directorates, and school ties, confusion has arise because “business group” has also often been used to 
mean “family business group.”   
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for a recent review), the studies have been relatively silent on how business group 
affiliation and family control may influence a firm’s strategic resource allocation 
decision, an important precursor to firm performance and competitive advantage(Carney 
et al., 2011).
31
 The lack of attention is surprising since the influence of other corporate 
ownership and governance structures (e.g., alliance, vertical integration, acquisition) on 
strategic firm resource allocation has received much attention in the literature (Coase, 
1937; Kapoor & Lee, 2010; Mullainathan & Scharfstein, 2001). 
In this study, we isolate the effects of family control and business group affiliation 
on R&D investment, a critical firm resource allocation decision, and then examine their 
combinative effect. Our findings suggest that the business group affiliation has different 
influences on R&D investment of the firm depending on the identity of owners; while 
family control and business group affiliation individually are not negatively associated 
with a lower level of R&D investment, the combination of family control and business 
group affiliation has a negative influence on R&D investment of the firm. Our 
contributions are threefold. First, our findings suggest that the business group affiliation 
may change a controlling family’s preference in strategic resource allocation; family 
owners are usually long-term oriented in their investment horizon, but when they control 
a business group, the long-term orientation may not persist. This finding attests to the 
importance of the governance structure (e.g., business group) in understanding strategic 
resource allocation. Second, we contribute to the business group and family business 
literature by presenting the first study to examine both separate and combined effects of 
family control and business group affiliation on strategic firm decision-making. Third, 
                                                          
31 A notable exception is Belenzon and Berkovitz (2010), which examines the relationship between business group and 
innovation. However, they do not look at ownership identity of business group affiliated firms. 
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our result suggests that propping and tunneling, attributable to an excessive control power 
over actual cash flow rights, are responsible for the negative combinative effect of family 
control and business group affiliation on R&D investment. Hence, our study reveals that 
it is not the family ownership per se but the excessive control over cash flow rights 
affecting the firm decision to invest in R&D, supplying an interesting insight to the 
family business literature.  
The empirical context of our study is Korean manufacturing industry from 2001 
to 2008. The Korean economy encompasses a broader spectrum of firms with different 
governance and ownership structures including family business, business group, and 
family-controlled business group. Especially, an attractive feature of Korean data is that, 
unlike the proxy statement of U.S. firms, the proxy statements of Korean firms include 
the information about the names and proportion of equity holdings of the largest 
shareholders and relatives of them (e.g., spouse, siblings, sons, and daughters), in 
addition to of affiliated firms and executives.  Furthermore, since Korean firms are 
advised to clarify their affiliation to the business groups in their proxy statement, figuring 
out the equity ownership of family members and business group affiliation of Korean 
firms is clear and precise. Hence, Korean firms serves as an appropriate empirical setting 
to examine both separate and combinative effects of business group affiliation and family 
control on strategic firm resource allocation.  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The Influence of Family Control on R&D Investment 
 
The literature on family business suggests that family control will have a positive 
effect on R&D investment of the firm (Andersen & Reeb, 2003; James, 1999; Stein, 
1988). First, family shareholders possess strong incentives to engage in investment 
activities that ensure the long-term viability and health of the firm. In general, publicly 
owned (dispersed ownership) firms focus on short-term profit maximization, because 
their shareholders pressure managers for short-term profit (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 
1991; Graves, 1988); if the profit declines, short-term-oriented public shareholders will 
not hesitate to sell off the firm stocks. In contrast, family-controlled firms can maintain a 
longer-term perspective, because family shareholders have a strong emotional attachment 
to the firm and therefore may promote its long-term success and survival (Andersen & 
Reeb, 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al.,2007; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). 
Family shareholders focus on long-term performance and survival of the firm is 
further promoted because they wish to pass on the firm to their descendants (Casson, 
1999). Often, the controlling family considers the firm as a family asset to be preserved 
and inherited (James, 1999). Perception of the firm as an inheritable family asset 
promotes the long-term view of family shareholders (Andersen, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003). 
Therefore, family shareholders try to maintain long-term firm value by investing in long-
term-oriented items such as R&D, even though such investments may harm short-term 
profitability of the firm. The family shareholders’ unique long-term-oriented perspective 
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and intention to pass on the firm to their descendants suggest that family-controlled firms 
will invest more in R&D than publicly owned firms.  
To understand the separate effect of the family-control effect on R&D, we first 
compare family-controlled, non–business group firms with non-family-controlled, non–
business group firms.  
 
Hypothesis 1. Family-controlled, non–business group firms are more likely to 
have a higher level of R&D investment than non-family-controlled, non–business 
group firms. 
 
The Influence of Business Group Affiliation on R&D Investment  
 
Previous studies on the business group suggest that the business group affiliation 
has a positive influence on R&D investment of the firm, for two reasons. First, business 
group affiliation helps firms to acquire scarce and valuable inputs such as capital and 
information via internal markets (Chang & Hong, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). In 
particular, because of information asymmetry between inside managers and outside 
investors on innovation, it is hard for outside investors to fully acknowledge the value of 
innovation that inside managers try to pursue (Himmelberg & Peterson, 1994). Also, 
outside investors often prefer short-term gains over long-term profits of the firm they 
invest in. Thus, the internal capital market serves as a critical pool of resources for 
innovation when outside investors are reluctant to invest in firms that pursue long-term 
projects. The preferential access to internal capital and information enables the firms 
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within business groups to allocate resources on new innovative opportunities in a more 
timely and effective manner than non–business group firms. Second, the business group 
affiliation also enables firms to raise external capital more easily because of lower 
bankruptcy risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Montgomery, 1994). The enhanced debt capacity 
and low bankruptcy risk will help business group firms to invest in uncertain long-term 
items such as R&D. 
Because business groups are often controlled by families (Chang, 2003), it is 
difficult to isolate the effects of business group affiliation and family control on R&D 
investment. To understand the separate effect of business group affiliation on R&D 
investment of the firm, we compare business group, non-family-controlled firms with 
non–business group, non-family-controlled firms.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Non-family-controlled business group firms are more likely to have 
a higher level of R&D investment than non-family-controlled, non–business group 
firms. 
 
Combinative Effect of Family-Control and Business Group Affiliation on R&D 
Investment 
 
While family control is expected to have a positive effect on R&D investment of 
the firm (H1), we propose that when a family controls a business group, family control is 
more likely to exert a negative influence on R&D investment of the firms that are 
affiliated with that business group. We argue that the negative combinative effect is 
attributable to the facts that (1) the controlling family intends to promote the benefit of 
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the business group as a whole, not of a single affiliate firm and (2) the controlling family 
often has excessive control over actual ownership rights, a property that gives the 
controlling family an opportunity to expropriate the value from the business group.  
The negative combinative effect of family-control and business group affiliation 
on R&D investment is closely related to the two unique intra-firm resource allocation 
patterns of the family-controlled business group: propping and tunneling (Bae, Cheon, & 
Kang, 2008; Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Friedman, Johnson, & Mitton, 2003; Johnson, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). First, propping is closely related to the 
family’s pursuit of the benefit of the business group as a whole and not of a single 
affiliate firm. Through propping, the controlling family transfers the resources within the 
business group to help or “prop up” a financially troubled affiliate (Bae et al., 2008; Bae 
et al., 2002; Friedman et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2000). Propped-up firms may avoid 
bankruptcy and the family can protect the business group as a whole, while the 
performance of propping firms may be compromised (Friedman et al., 2003; Hoshi, 
Kashyap, & Scharfstein, 1991).  
We expect that propping will have a negative effect on R&D investment of the 
firms affiliated with the family-controlled business group. The financial resources for 
propping come from other, healthier affiliates. Passing resources to troubled affiliates 
will lower the healthier affiliates’ ability to invest in R&D (Grabowski, 1968; Mansfield, 
1964; Mueller, 1967). Also, financially troubled affiliates (the propped-up firms) that 
receive funds from healthier affiliates will not be able to spend the funds on R&D either; 
the emergency funds acquired through propping will be used to meet more immediate 
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needs such as paying short-term debts. Therefore, propping will lower R&D investment 
of the firms within the family-controlled business group. 
Second, through tunneling, the controlling family transfers resources within the 
business group and eventually to its private fund (Johnson et al., 2000). The excessive 
controlling power over actual cash flow ownership, a common property of the family-
controlled business group, gives the family both incentives and power to expropriate 
resources from the business group through tunneling (Claessens et al., 2002). 
Discrepancy in cash flow rights and voting rights creates severe agency problems 
between controlling family and other minority shareholders,
32
 since it gives the former 
group substantial power over important strategic decisions while enabling them to avoid 
the full cost of any negative outcomes. For example, family members who control 
corporate assets will want to transfer, or tunnel, profits across firms, moving them from 
firms where they have low cash flow rights to firms where they have high cash flow 
rights, thus generating private benefits.
33
  
While these incentives and control power are relatively low when there is no 
discrepancy between cash flow rights and voting rights of controlling shareholders, the 
incentives and control power enlarge when there is excessive controlling power over 
actual cash flow rights, when controlling shareholders do not bear the full cost of their 
actions (Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis, 2000). Previous studies on family businesses 
with excessive control show that, for the controlling shareholders, the difference between 
control rights and cash-flow rights is associated with a value discount that is due to 
                                                          
32 Villalonga and Amit (2006: 387) call this conflict between the controlling shareholders and other small shareholders 
“agency problem II.” Young et al. (2008: 197) call it “principal-principal conflict.” 
33 Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) discuss several ways by which controlling shareholders can transfer funds 
across firms: the firms can give each other high (or low) interest rate loans, manipulate transfer prices, or sell assets to 
each other at above- or below-market prices. 
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agency costs generated by controlling shareholders expropriating value of minority 
shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). When tunneling occurs 
within business groups, the affiliates that gave up resources are most likely to reduce 
R&D spending afterwards, given that R&D spending is highly sensitive to availability of 
funds (Grabowski, 1968; Mansfield, 1964; Mueller, 1967). Alternatively, the affiliates 
that give up resources may have to reduce nonessential spending such as R&D in advance, 
to generate funds to be tunneled. The receiving affiliates will not increase R&D spending 
either, despite the influx of resources, because the tunneled resources do not stay with 
affiliates but shortly will be expropriated out of the business group into the family’s 
pockets (Bae et al., 2002; Friedman et al., 2003). The negative implications of propping 
and tunneling for R&D investment suggest that R&D investment of firms belonging to a 
family-controlled business group will be lower than that of firms belonging to a non-
family-controlled business group.  
 
Hypothesis 3a. Family-controlled business group firms are more likely to have a 
lower level of R&D investment than non-family-controlled business group firms. 
 
The same logic applies to comparison of R&D investment of firms in a family-
controlled business group and family-controlled standalone firms.  
 
Hypothesis 3b. Family-controlled business group firms are more likely to have a
 lower level of R&D investment than family-controlled, non–business group firms. 
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Although we expect that family-controlled business group firms will have a lower 
level of R&D intensity than family-controlled, non–business group firms (H3a) and non-
family-controlled business group firms (H3b), we have not compared family-controlled 
business group with non-family-controlled, non–business group firms. Within the family-
controlled business group, propping will reduce the healthier affiliates’ ability to invest in 
R&D as well as do not contribute to the propped-up affiliates’ ability to invest in R&D, 
lowering the level of R&D investment across all firms within the family-controlled 
business group. Tunneling will also reduce the ability of all firms within the family-
controlled business group, as it drains financial resources from affiliated firms into the 
private funds of the controlling family. Considering that non-family-controlled, non–
business group firms do not suffer from the problems of propping and tunneling, family-
controlled business group firms will have a lower level of R&D intensity than non-
family-controlled, non–business group firms. 
The negative implications of propping and tunneling on R&D investment (H3) 
suggest that family-controlled business group firms may invest less in R&D than non-
family-controlled, non–business group firms, as well. Therefore, family-controlled 
business group firms will have the lowest level of R&D intensity, compared with other 
three categories. 
 
Hypothesis 4a. Family-controlled business group firms are more likely to have a 
lower level of R&D investment than non-family-controlled, non–business group 
firms.  
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However, despite the problem of propping and tunneling, it is also possible that 
family-controlled business groups may be superior to non-family-controlled, non–
business group firms in terms of resource allocation for long-term investment, given the 
unique advantages of family-control (H1) and business group mode (H2) on R&D 
investment. Even though propping and tunneling may lower the ability of firms to invest 
in R&D, family-controlled business group firms may be able to maintain long-term 
investment horizon than non-family-controlled, non–business group firms. Also, despite 
the negative implication of propping and tunneling, family-controlled business group 
firms may still enjoy the advantage of internal capital and information market in pursuing 
risky, long-term investment like R&D than non-family-controlled, non–business group 
firms. Therefore, family-controlled business group firms may have a higher level of R&D 
investment than non-family-controlled, non–business group firms. 
 
Hypothesis 4b. Family-controlled business group firms are more likely to have a 
higher level of R&D investment than non-family-controlled, non–business group 
firms.  
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Figure 8: Description of Four Categories 
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METHODS 
 
Environmental Setting 
 
For this study, we use data from the Korean stock market from 2001 to 2008. 
Korea offers a unique setting for examining the link between firm governance modes 
(i.e., family ownership and business group affiliation) and behavior of firms. First, 
compared to the U.S. economy, Korea’s economy provides a context where family-
controlled business is more prevalent, resulting in totally different dynamics in corporate 
governance and agency problems. Because of family-controlled firms’ unique features, 
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traditional agency problems between shareholders and managers can be supplanted by 
agency conflicts between controlling families and minority shareholders. Second, in 
Korea, control pyramids—in which tiers of independent firms hold control blocks in 
other independent firms, thus forming business groups—are relatively commonplace. 
While control pyramids rarely exist in the U.S., they are widely used by controlling 
families in other parts of the world (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). Thus, 
understanding how control pyramids affect the decisions of controlling families is an 
important question that has received relative little attention by governance scholars. 
Third, Korean companies have successfully evolved from mere imitators to leading 
innovators (e.g., Samsung, LG, POSCO, and Hyundai Motors). The main factor that 
made this catch-up possible is their extensive investments in R&D activities, which have 
led to improved technological capabilities (Cho, Kim, & Rhee, 1998; Kim, 1997). Thus, 
understanding who drove the R&D investments of Korean firms is a salient question.  
We choose a period after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 to distinguish the 
effects of family-control and business group modes from the effect of the underdeveloped 
corporate governance system. It is widely understood that Korea’s poor corporate 
governance system helped cause the financial crisis in 1997 (Joh, 2003). Thus, studies 
using data which predates 1997 would have a hard time teasing out the effects of family-
control and business group mode from the effect of the poor corporate governance 
system. In contrast, since the outbreak of the crisis, Korean firms have had incentive to 
build legitimate corporate governance systems because of fortified government 
regulations and increased credit from foreign shareholders. For example, the government 
authorities removed foreign investors’ ceiling on shareholding volume, advised business 
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groups to create holding companies, and introduced regulation that forced companies to 
include a certain proportion of outside directors. The reformations have improved 
corporate governance to a decent level which, in turn, improved firm performance (Choi 
et al., 2007). Thus, by choosing the period from 2001 to 2008, we can examine the effect 
of business groups in a relatively developed corporate governance system, eliminating 
any concern about the disturbing impact of poor corporate governance institutions. 
 
Data 
 
The primary source of data for this study is the database maintained by the Korea 
Information Service (KIS). The KIS is a major credit-rating agency that offers ownership 
data as well as company profiles and financial information data on all Korean public 
firms since the early 1980s (Chang & Hong, 2000). We collect all numerical figures for 
sample companies and ownership information from the KIS database. For our initial 
sample, we obtain information on all manufacturing industry firms listed on the Korea 
Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2008. We control for survivorship bias by allowing firms’ 
exit from our sample during our sample period (unbalanced panel). This initial dataset 
contains 568 firms in the manufacturing industry.  
A primary issue in using firm-level investment data, particularly R&D 
expenditures, is that firms sometimes do not report R&D expense in detail; the KIS 
database codes this data as missing.
34
 Of our 568 firm observations, the KIS database 
                                                          
34 This missing data is not unique to Korea settings (or to the KIS database). Hall (1993) states that, even in the U.S., 
firms (or COMPUSTAT) sometimes do not report the magnitude of R&D investments.  
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provides R&D investments for 524 observations.
35
 To supplement our firm ownership 
data, we manually collected data from corporate annual reports (which correspond to 
proxy statements of U.S. companies) from 2001 through 2008 on ownership structure, 
including ownership levels, ownership identity, and pyramidal holdings. Unlike the proxy 
statement of U.S. firms, the proxy statements of Korean firms include the information 
about the names and proportion of equity holdings of the largest shareholders and 
relatives of them (e.g., spouse, siblings, sons, and daughters), in addition to of affiliated 
firms and executives.  In addition, Korean firms are advised to clarify their affiliation to 
the business groups in their proxy statement. Finally, these data are supplemented with 
information from the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) database and public sources 
(e.g., corporation websites, brochures, various Financial Supervisory Service filings, 
business articles, and web searches). Other missing data further reduced firm 
observations to 515.  
Our models provide a one-year lag between the measurements of predictors and 
dependent variable. Thus, our final dataset consists of 464 firm observations and 2,474 
firm-year observations. 
 
Variables 
 
Dependent variable. This study investigates the effect of the governance structure on the 
strategic decisions of family-controlled firms. Among various aspects of strategic 
                                                          
35 We perform a robustness check by including a dummy variable, “R&D not reported,” to control for any potential 
effect of missing R&D investment data. All of our results (available upon request) remain substantively unchanged.  
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investment decisions, we focus on R&D investment of a firm, for two reasons. First, 
R&D investment is becoming increasingly important for manufacturing firms, since 
development of new technology may strongly affect the payoff function and maximize 
the value of the firm (Badaracco, 1991). Second, Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002) 
indicate that R&D spending has a substantial impact on firm risk when compared to other 
expenditures, suggesting that it should be sensitive to decisions of large shareholders and 
managers of the firm. Thus, two distinct features of R&D investment allow us to examine 
interesting firm dynamics between different sets of players (e.g., shareholders, managers, 
founder, families of founder, and institutions). Following previous studies related to R&D 
investments (e.g., Greve, 2003; Lee & O’Neill, 2003; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2008), we 
measure R&D intensity as the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales of the focal firm.  
Independent variables. We define a firm as a family-controlled non–business group firm 
if family members of the founder hold more than 20% of the firm’s total equity and the 
firm is not a member of a business group. The 20% criterion has often been used in 
previous studies as a minimum threshold to represent the control of the firm (Claessens et 
al., 2002). We give a value of 1 for family-controlled non–business group firm if the firm 
matches the above conditions.  
To separate the effect of business group governance mode, we first distinguish 
firms that belong to business group from standalone firms. The information regarding 
business group governance mode is collected through two distinct phrases. We begin by 
extracting from the KIS database all companies that belong to one of the business groups 
during our sample period. The KIS identifies business groups and companies that are 
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affiliated with those groups following the definition of the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission (KFTC). Specifically, the KFTC defines a business group as “a group of 
companies of which more than 30% shares are owned by individuals or by companies 
that are controlled by those individuals, or those that are de facto controlled by them 
despite lower ownership control.”
36
 To check the validity of the data, we further consult 
each company’s annual reports, which contain information on whether a focal firm 
belongs to a business group defined by the KFTC. If we find any discordance between 
the data collected from the KIS database and annual reports of firms, we refer to public 
sources including corporation websites, brochures, various Financial Supervisory Service 
filings, business articles, and web searches. We only accept information identified in at 
least two distinct sources and for which no other source presents counterevidence. 
After business group firms are defined, we determine whether the firm is 
controlled by family members by cross-checking annual reports and websites of each 
company. The controller of a group is defined as a person who holds majority shares of 
member companies and/or exercises controlling influence over them, based upon the 
KFTC’s definition. The names of controllers are collected from annual reports of 
companies. Then we define the firms belonging to the business groups that are not 
controlled by family owners as non-family business group firms. We give a value of 1 for 
non-family business group firm if a firm matches the above condition. This variable 
includes firms such as POSCO, Hynix, and KT. Finally, a firm is defined as a family-
controlled business group firm if the firm belongs to business groups that are controlled 
                                                          
36 The KFTC further specifies the latter criterion, such as exchange of directors and managers and substantial business 
transactions between a firm that belongs to the business group and the focal company. 
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by family members. We designate a value of 1 for family-controlled business group firm 
if the firm matches the above condition. This variable includes firms such as Samsung 
Electronics, Hyundai Motors, and LG Electronics. 
Control variables. We also use a number of controls that have been found to be 
influential over R&D investments by previous research. It is possible that the influence of 
business group affiliation on R&D investment may not be identical among business 
groups of diverse size, since large Korean business groups have been found to be 
different from small and medium-sized groups in various aspects such as profitability, 
financial slack, growth rate, and investment in CAPEX (Choo, Lee, Ryu, & Yoon, 2009). 
Thus, we add a large business group dummy that equals 1 for firms that belong to “large 
business groups” in order to find out whether there is systematic difference in terms of 
R&D investment. The KFTC annually designates “large business groups” as groups of 
firms with more than 2 trillion won in total assets; these groups are under stricter 
regulations (e.g., a ceiling on total amount of equity investment and restriction on cross-
shareholding).
37
 We categorize firms into large business group by using the annual lists 
published by the KFTC. Based on the two-digit Korean Standard Industrial Classification 
(KSIC) codes, we identify industries including chemicals (KSIC Codes 20 to 22), 
machinery (KSIC Codes 29 to 31), and electronics (KSIC Codes 26 to 29) (Kim et al., 
2008). Then, we include an R&D intensive dummy that equals 1 for firms belonging to 
these industries in order to tease out the effect of R&D-intensive industries. Foreigner 
equity is measured as the percentage of common equity held by foreign investors at the 
                                                          
37 From 2001 to 2008, the KFTC’s “large business groups” were those with more than 2 trillion won in assets. However, 
in 2008, the revision of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act raised the bar to 5 trillion won. To maintain 
compatibility, we utilized the 2 trillion won criterion for the entire sample period. 
113 
 
end of each year. We include this variable because foreign ownership level has been 
found to influence investment in R&D activity (Bushee, 1998; David, Yoshikawa, Chari, 
& Rasheed, 2006). Previous studies have adopted R&D intensity and advertising 
intensity as proxies for the same construct, intangible knowledge-based resource (Chang, 
2003; Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). Thus, the level of one variable may affect that of 
another. So advertising intensity, gauged as the ratio of advertising expenditures to total 
sales of the firm, is included in the model. Furthermore, we include leverage ratio, 
measured as the book value of debt divided by total equity. We also add firm 
performance, which is measured as the return on invested capital (ROIC) of a focal firm, 
and firm size, which is the natural logarithm of net sales of a firm. Finally, we include 
eight calendar-year dummies to control for possible year effects and two-digit KSIC 
industry dummies to control for possible industry effects. 
 
Analysis 
 
To test our hypotheses, we use firm fixed effects regression, which allows us to 
control for time-invariant unobservable firm dimensions that are not explicitly controlled 
in our regression. Failure to control for such effects can significantly bias regression 
estimates (Heckman, 1981). While a Hausman test reveals that the estimated panel error 
is correlated with independent variables—an assumption necessary for use of a random-
effects model—this is significant at the marginal level.
38
 Thus, we supplement test of our 
hypotheses by additionally using a random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) 
                                                          
38 Difference in coefficient is significant at the 0.05% level. 
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regression (Wooldridge, 2002). The entire individual variable VIF values were below 2.5, 
and mean VIF was below 1.5 for all models, which is well below the recommended 
cutoff of 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a concern. Finally, we control for 
serial correlation by including yearly dummy variables and a previous-year R&D 
intensity variable. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 17 provides descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables. There are 
several notably high correlations among variables. For example, large and more 
profitable firms have a higher level of foreigner equity ownership.  
Table 18 reports the results of the hypothesis testing. Models 1 and 3 are the base 
models, which include only the control variables. Regarding these control variables, 
performance (ROIC), R&D intensity of the previous year, and R&D intensive industry 
dummy have statistically significant relationships with the R&D intensity of the current 
year. The coefficients of control variables suggest that firms that (1) are less profitable, 
(2) have invested more in R&D, and (3) belong to an R&D-intensive industry tend to 
invest more in R&D.  
The results of Model 2 support hypothesis 1, which states that family control 
alone will have a positive influence on R&D investment of the firm (β=0.382, p<0.05). 
Model 2 also shows that when a family controls a business group, firms belonging to the 
group will invest in R&D less than non-family-controlled, non–business group firms (β=-
0.256, p<0.1), supporting hypothesis 4a.  
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However, we did not find support for hypothesis 2, which predicts that business 
group affiliation alone will have a positive influence on R&D investment of the firm. One 
possible reason may be that, while we tease out family-controlled business group firms 
from others, we fail to control for other types of controlling shareholders that may affect 
investment decisions. We fail to do so because we do not find a meaningful number of 
firms in distinct types of business groups. For example, state-owned business group firms 
may be less likely to invest in risky projects because of their risk aversion (Nee, 1992), 
while business group firms with dispersed ownership may be more likely to invest in 
risky projects, since their risks are already diversified in their portfolio investments (Kim 
et al., 2008). Thus, in our model, we may be capturing confounding effects of distinct 
ownership types of business groups. 
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Table 17: Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
    Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 R&D Intensity (T1) 1.53 2.29 1.00                       
2 
Family Business & 
Business Group 0.78 0.41 -0.03 1.00                     
3 
Non-Family-Business 
& Business Group 0.05 0.22 0.02 -0.44 1.00                   
4 
Family Business & 
Non–Business Group 0.09 0.28 0.00 -0.58 -0.07 1.00                 
5 
Large Business 
Group Dummy 0.13 0.33 0.02 0.16 -0.02 -0.12 1.00               
6 Firm Size 25.88 1.52 -0.02 0.16 0.10 -0.16 0.49 1.00             
7 ROIC 0.05 0.19 -0.11 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.27 1.00           
8 Leverage Ratio 1.43 9.93 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 1.00         
9 Foreigners’ Equity 8.76 14.23 0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.08 0.24 0.49 0.20 -0.03 1.00       
10 Advertising Intensity 0.01 0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.18 1.00     
11 R&D Intensity (T0) 1.73 8.12 0.32 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.05 1.00   
12 
R&D Intensive 
Industry 0.51 0.50 0.20 0.14 -0.08 -0.09 0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.24 0.06 1.00 
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Table 18: Fixed-Effect and Random-Effect Regressions 
 
  Fixed Effect Random Effect 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Family Business & Non-Business 
Group  
  0.382**   0.129 
    (0.195)   (0.180) 
Non-Family & Business Group    -0.121   -0.118 
    (0.206)   (0.194) 
Family Business & Business Group     -0.256*   -0.375*** 
    (0.151)   (0.138) 
Large Business Group Dummy -0.0527 -0.0262 -0.0168 0.0209 
  (0.138) (0.138) (0.126) (0.127) 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 0.136 0.171* 0.111** 0.131** 
  (0.092) (0.093) (0.051) (0.051) 
Performance (ROIC) -0.530** -0.548*** -0.682*** -0.691*** 
  (0.210) (0.210) (0.203) (0.202) 
Leverage Ratio 0.0016 0.00168 0.00345 0.00312 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Foreigners’ Equity 0.00203 0.00326 0.00672* 0.00693* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Advertising Intensity -3.894 -3.074 1.663 2.016 
  (3.782) (3.778) (2.985) (2.979) 
R&D Intensity (year lagged) 0.0309*** 0.0313*** 0.0360*** 0.0362*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
R&D Intensive Industry 3.058*** 3.015*** 0.493 0.503 
  (0.949) (0.946) (0.626) (0.625) 
Constant -3.505 -4.258 -2.863** -3.119** 
  (2.727) (2.733) (1.344) (1.349) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes Yes No No 
Observations 2474 2474 2474 2474 
R-squared 0.087 0.096  0.3385     0.3403  
Number of firms 464 464 464 464 
a
 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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To test hypothesis 3, we conducted the Wald test (Tables 19 and 20). In 
hypothesis 3, we compare the R&D intensity of family-controlled business group firms 
with that of non-family-controlled business group firms (H3a) and family-controlled 
non–business group firms (H3b). To answer this question, we compared the regression 
coefficients of family-controlled business group firms with those of non-family-
controlled business group firms and family-controlled non–business group firms. The 
first set of the Wald test results shows that coefficients for family-controlled business 
group firms are significantly different from those of family-controlled non–business 
group firms (fixed effects regression coefficients: F=4.5, p=0.000, random effects 
regression coefficients: χ
2
=12.87, p=0.000), supporting hypothesis 3b. In contrast, the 
second set of the Wald tests suggests that the coefficients of the family-controlled 
business group firms and those of non-family-controlled business group firms are not 
significantly different. Therefore, H3 is partially supported. 
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Table 19: Difference Between Fixed-Effect Coefficient Estimates Using Wald Test 
 
 Null Hypothesis F(1,1985) Prob > F 
H3a 
Family Business & Business Group 
 = Non-Family & Business Group 
0.47 0.4944 
H3b 
Family Business & Business Group 
 = Family Business & Non–Business Group 
4.5 0.0000 
 
 
Table 20: Difference Between Random-Effect Coefficient Estimates Using Wald 
Test 
 
 Null Hypothesis Chi
2
(2) Prob > Chi
2
 
H3a 
Family Business & Business Group  
= Non-Family & Business Group 
2.09 0.1483 
H3b 
Family Business & Business Group  
= Family Business & Non–Business Group 
12.87 0.0000 
 
Propping and Tunneling within the Family-controlled Business Group Firms  
 
While we propose that propping and tunneling are the main mechanisms behind 
the negative relationship between the family-controlled business group membership and 
R&D intensity (Hypothesis 3a, b), we have not empirically establish that propping and 
tunneling actually occurs. Indeed, propping and tunneling are a big research subject on 
their own and have been confirmed repeatedly by a number of previous studies (Bae et 
al., 2008; Bae et al., 2002; Chang, 2003; Chang & Hong, 2000; Friedman et al., 2003; 
Hoshi et al., 1991). However, some evidence of propping and tunneling occurring in 
family-controlled business group firms in our sample may strengthen our predictions and 
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findings. Hence, we conducted two additional tests to find evidence that propping and 
tunneling actually occur in family-controlled business group firms in our sample.
39
  
Our strategy was to identify the linkage among R&D intensity, internal 
transaction within business group (proxy of propping and tunneling), and family-
controlled business group membership. Therefore, this analysis consists of two stages. 
Our first step was to regress R&D intensity on internal transaction variables, which were 
used as proxies for propping and tunneling (Table 21).
40
 The result suggests that internal 
transaction inflow had a statistically significant negative impact on R&D intensity (β=-
0.075, p<0.05). Therefore, the result supports that a firm's internal transaction, a proxy of 
propping and tunneling have a negative impact on R&D intensity, establishing the first 
linkage between R&D intensity and propping and tunneling. In contrast, internal 
transaction outflow is not related to R&D intensity in a statistically significant manner.   
                                                          
39 We measured internal transaction inflow and outflow as natural logarithm of internal sales and expense, respectively. 
40Due to a large number of missing observations of internal transaction variables, the regression models in Table 21, 22, 
and 23 have a smaller number of observations compared to our main result (Table 18). 
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Table 21:Effect of Internal Transaction on R&D Intensity 
 
Variables Fixed Effect 
Internal Transaction Inflow -0.075** 
  (0.035) 
Internal Transaction Outflow 0.044 
 (0.030) 
Large Business Group Dummy -0.008 
  (0.207) 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 0.601*** 
  (0.147) 
Performance  -0.002 
  (0.002) 
Leverage Ratio 0.001 
  (0.016) 
Foreigners’ Equity 0.004 
  (0.006) 
Advertising Intensity -10.213** 
  (5.166) 
R&D Intensity 0.372 
  (0.036) 
R&D Intensive Industry -1.124 
  (1.404) 
Constant -13.882*** 
  (3.960) 
Year Dummy Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes 
Observations 676 
R-squared 0.262 
Number of firms 230 
  a
 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The next step was to show that family-controlled business group membership is 
positively related to internal transaction. In Table 22, we found that among business 
group affiliated firms in our sample, firms that are controlled by families receive a larger 
internal transaction inflow from their affiliate firms (β=0.622, p<0.05). Hence, Table 22 
suggests that family control  increases tunneling and propping within business group. In 
contrast, we did not find a similar evidence of propping and tunneling when internal 
transaction outflow was used (Table 23). The results of this additional analysis can be 
summarized that family-controlled business group firms have a high level of propping 
and tunneling, measured as internal transaction inflow, which in turn has a negative 
impact on R&D intensity of these firms.  
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Table 22: Effect of Family Control on Internal Transaction Inflow 
 
Variables Fixed Effect 
Family Control 0.622** 
  (0.300) 
Large Business Group Dummy 0.001 
  (0.188) 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 0.552*** 
  (0.188) 
Performance 0.002 
  (0.002) 
Leverage Ratio -0.008** 
  (0.004) 
Foreigners’ Equity 0.003 
  (0.005) 
Net Sales Growth Rate 0.000 
  (0.000) 
R&D Intensity 0.02 
  (0.034) 
Constant 7.931 
  (3.144) 
Year Dummy Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes 
Observations 1623 
R-squared 0.073 
Number of firms 366 
  a
 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 23: Effect of Family Control on Internal Transaction Outflow 
 
Variables Fixed Effect 
Family Control 0.139 
  (0.416) 
Large Business Group Dummy 0.265 
  (0.167) 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 0.809*** 
  (0.138) 
Performance  -0.002 
  (0.002) 
Leverage Ratio 0.011 
  (0.014) 
Foreigners’ Equity 0.004 
  (0.007) 
Net Sales Growth Rate 0.000** 
  (0.000) 
R&D Intensity 0.059 
  (0.035) 
Constant 0.751 
  (3.632) 
Year Dummy Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes 
Observations 1482 
R-squared 0.093 
Number of firms 368 
  a
 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Robustness Checks 
 
Because our data were panelized and the dependent variables were limited—that 
is, they could not take a negative value and contained numerous observations with values 
equal to 0—we applied a tobit panel data methodology in additional to our main 
regression. Specifically, we employed tobit random effect models using industry at the 2-
digit KSIC level as the group variable in order to control for any industry-related variance. 
Because tobit panel data methodology cannot pursue a fixed-effect model,
41
 we ran the 
tobit random effect models only as a robustness check for our primary analyses in Table 
24 and 25. The results of these analyses were substantively unchanged from those 
reported in our random effects models. 
  
                                                          
41 Stata10 notes that a conditional-effect model is inaccessible, as there does not exist a sufficient statistic allowing the 
fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood (Stata10, 2007: 455). Also, while unconditional fixed effects may 
be estimated, care must be taken with this approach, because unconditional fixed-effects estimates are biased (Stata10, 
2007: 455). 
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Table 24: Tobit Random-Effects Regression Model 
 
Variables Model 5 
Family Business & Non–Business Group (H1) 0.157 
  (0.179) 
Non-Family & Business Group (H2) -0.12 
  (0.192) 
Family Business & Business Group  (H4) -0.365*** 
  (0.137) 
Large Business Group Dummy 0.0142 
  (0.125) 
Firm Size (Log Sales) 0.134** 
  (0.052) 
Performance (ROIC) -0.672*** 
  (0.199) 
Leverage Ratio 0.00307 
  (0.003) 
Foreigners’ Equity 0.00655* 
  (0.004) 
Advertising Intensity 1.59 
  (3.003) 
R&D Intensity (year lagged) 0.0355*** 
  (0.003) 
R&D Intensive Industry 0.522 
  (0.660) 
Constant -3.240** 
  (1.386) 
Year Dummy Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes 
Observations 2474 
Number of firms 464 
             
a
 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 25: Difference Between Tobit Random-Effect Coefficient Estimates Using 
Wald Test 
 
 Null Hypothesis Chi
2
(2) Prob > Chi
2
 
H3a 
Family Business & Business Group 
 = Non-Family & Business Group 
1.91 0.1665 
H3b 
Family Business & Business Group 
 = Family Business & Non–Business Group 
14.03 0.0002 
 
On the Endogeneity Issue 
 
Our findings could potentially suffer from endogeneity, a phenomenon wherein 
ownership level is influenced by R&D investments rather than the other way around. For 
example, it is arguable that a certain type of investor may be more attracted to firms with 
higher R&D investments and not the other way around. This endogeneity between 
ownership level and the R&D investments may cause inconsistent findings for our results. 
However, this is unlikely to be a serious problem in our study because the family’s 
ownership level has remained relatively stable over time to maintain their control over 
the firm. In a similar study, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) found that equity ownerships 
of large shareholders are characterized as structurally stable, mitigating our concerns 
about endogeneity. Nevertheless, we used lagged independent variables to partially 
control for this possible endogeneity issue.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we propose that while family-control and business group affiliation 
each may promote R&D investment of the firm, the combination of the two properties 
may not do so. Our results show that when a family controls an individual firm, the 
family control has a positive influence on R&D investment of the firm. In contrast, when 
a family controls a business group, the family control has a negative influence on R&D 
investment of the business group firms. The negative combinative effect of family control 
and business group membership on R&D investment may be attributable to tunneling and 
propping within the family-controlled business groups. Our findings suggest that 
overlooking the role of either condition may result in incomplete understanding about 
their influence on R&D investment. 
 Indeed, previous studies on family business have been divided about the influence 
of family control on long-term investment and performance of the firm. Emotional 
attachment and long-term orientation of the family shareholders suggest that family 
control may have a positive influence on R&D investment of the firm (Andersen & Reeb, 
2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008), while propping and 
tunneling associated with the family’s excessive controlling power over actual cash flow 
rights suggest that the family control may have a negative influence on R&D investment 
of the firm (Bae et al., 2002; Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002). Similarly, 
previous studies on business groups have been divided about the influence of business 
group membership on long-term investment and performance of the firm (Chacar & 
Vissa, 2005; Holmén & Högfeldt, 2009; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Shin & Park, 1999). 
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Our findings suggest that the lack of clarity surrounding business group membership may 
be attributable to overlooking the possible combinative effect with family control as well. 
Therefore, we contribute to the literature on family business and business groups by 
isolating the effects of family-control and business group membership on R&D 
investment of the firm and by clarifying their relationships. We also contribute to the 
growing principal-principal problem literature (Young et al., 2008). Our findings on the 
negative combinative effect of family-control and business group membership show that 
the principal-principal problem can compromise the firm’s long-term performance 
potential by hindering its long-term investment. 
 Our study has a limitation in that we only relied on Korean firms for our 
hypothesis testing, and therefore our results may have limited generalizability. An 
emerging economy like Korea may have weaker legal protection for its investors than 
Western economies, and such properties may generate unique outcomes (Kim et al., 
2008). However, Korean firms provide a good mix of family-controlled firms, business 
group firms, and family-controlled business group firms and therefore offer an ideal 
context to test our hypotheses. Despite the possible limitation in generalizability, our 
focus on Korean firms may be justified by many previous studies on family business and 
business groups that also focused on Korean firms (Bae et al., 2008; Bae et al., 2002; 
Baek, Kang, & Park, 2004; Chang, 2003; Chang & Hong, 2000; Kim et al., 2008). Still, it 
will be interesting to see whether our findings can be replicated in firms from other 
emerging economies or more developed economies.  
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Our findings have practical implications for investors. We found that family-
controlled firms tend to invest more resources in R&D, an important long-term 
investment. The long-term orientation of family-controlled firms suggests that investors 
with a long horizon may seek family-controlled firms as their investment targets. 
However, investors should become more careful when investing in a firm belonging to a 
family-controlled business group insofar as the business-group-controlling family may 
not place the highest priority on an individual affiliate’s long-term performance and 
survival. Even if investors successfully have identified a blue-chip affiliate within a 
business group, the superior return of the affiliate may not be entirely spent on re-
investment for the future or dividends to the shareholders of the firm.  
 The negative relationship between family-controlled business group affiliation 
and firm R&D investment found in our study suggests that family-control and business 
group affiliation may distort other resource allocation processes within the firm, as well. 
For example, managerial talent allocation, one of the most important firm resources, may 
be also affected by family-control and business group affiliation. If a business-group-
controlling family intends to improve performance of a suffering affiliate (propping) or a 
high cash flow right affiliate (tunneling), the controlling family may transfer the most 
talented group of managers to those affiliates, which may hurt the stock price of the 
affiliates from which those managers are tunneled. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to shed light on strategic decisions of family 
business firms by delving into internal and external corporate governance structures. 
Specifically, I focused on family firms' management, ownership, and control as internal 
corporate governance modes and family firms' business group mode as an external 
corporate governance mode.  
In essay 1, I examine the effects of target firms’ founder managers on firm value 
in the market for corporate control. My results show that target firms managed by 
founders receive on average about 10% higher takeover premium than their counterpart 
firms. I also find that among founder-managed firms, target firms with high-powered 
founders are more likely to receive higher takeover premiums. Furthermore, founder-
managed firms are more likely to receive higher takeover premiums than descendant-
managed firms. Lastly, the results reveal that bidder firms that acquire target firms with 
founder managers suffer lower abnormal returns than firms that acquire firms with non-
founder managers.  
In essay 2, I analyze the relationship between the heterogeneous governance 
structure of family-controlled firms and strategic investment. Specifically, I attempt to 
disentangle the effects of family ownership, management, and control, which are key 
elements of a corporate ownership structure with varying influences on the firm. I find 
that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between the ownership concentration levels 
of family controlled firms and R&D investment. I also find that firms with family 
shareholder managers are more likely to have higher levels of R&D investment. Lastly, 
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my findings reveal that, in certain cases, firms that use a pyramidal structure are more 
likely to have lower levels of R&D investment.   
In essay 3, I examine the individual and combined effects of family control and 
business group affiliation on R&D investment. I propose that family control and business 
group affiliation alone may positively affect the R&D investment of the firm. However, 
when family control and business group affiliation are combined, they may have a 
negative effect on R&D investment. The hypotheses are supported using Korean 
manufacturing industry data which provide unique rich data on family control and 
business group affiliation.  
While each of the three essays in this dissertation are independent, they have 
significant complementary elements. They all focus on firms which are managed by the 
founders and their family members. All of the studies focus on why family business firms 
may differ from other type of firms. In particular, I pay close attention to the different 
managerial characteristics of family members, which introduces diverse features such as 
the long-term investment horizon, legacy building, strong emotional attachment, and 
which differentiate family business firms from other firms. I draw my findings from two 
different empirical settings: the United States and Korea. Since the two settings are by 
and large different in their business environments, my findings from these two different 
settings complement each other, thus enlarging the generalizability of the findings. These 
findings collectively offer several important insights for strategy and corporate finance 
research as well as managerial practices on both the benefits and caveats of the corporate 
governance structure in founding family firms.   
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 First and foremost, the findings and implications of this dissertation strongly 
advocate that we should try to distinguish between family-controlled firms and non-
family-controlled firms in studies of corporate governance. With their unique 
relationships within their firms, founding family members may impose different 
preferences (e.g., values, cognition, perspectives) using various corporate governance 
mechanisms compared to non-founder managers. Specifically, family members may want 
to pursue the idiosyncratic psychological value of the firm by sacrificing short-term 
economic value which may lead to conflicts between the founder managers and other 
decision makers in the firm.  In my essays, significant differences in strategic decision 
making were found for family-controlled firms and non-family-controlled firms.  
Second, the dissertation contributes to the family business literature by identifying 
the heterogeneous corporate governance modes (e.g., internal and external) among family 
business firms and how they may systematically affect the strategic decisions of the firm.  
In addition, this study contributes to the top management team literature which, to date, 
has mainly focused on the characteristics and effects of hired professional managers. In 
contrast, this dissertation is one of the few large empirical studies to show that having a 
founder and his or her descendants in a firm’s top management team has a significant 
impact on the firm’s strategic decisions.  
Lastly, the dissertation also contributes to CEO succession literature by 
demonstrating that characteristics and preferences of succeeding family generations may 
be different from those of the founding generation. While previous studies on family 
CEO succession have argued that succeeding family CEOs may underperform, mostly 
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because they are selected from a small pool of managerial talent (Bennedsen et al., 2007; 
Perez-Gonza lez, 2006), my findings suggest that the succeeding family CEOs’ 
motivation may be another reason for their underperformance. Unlike previous studies 
that have commonly assumed that, similar to founders, the succeeding family members 
will try to maintain the long-term legacy of the family, my findings reveal that they are 
more interested in “cashing out” and using the family assets for their own personal 
benefit.  
 My dissertation is not without limitations. First, my each of the essays draw its 
data from a single country for the hypothesis testing, and therefore the results may have 
limited generalizability. An emerging economy like South Korea may have different 
institutional environments for its shareholders including family members compared to 
Western economies like the US, and such properties may generate unique outcomes. 
Thus, in the future, it will be fruitful to perform a comparative study for emerging 
economies and Western economies.  Second, although I have collected data about firms' 
behavior and performance from reliable sources that have been widely used in the 
strategy area, most of the data used in this study were obtained from indirect archival 
sources. Thus, my findings may lack first-handed insights from the real world. Future 
studies could greatly benefit from performing participant interviews and/or ethnography 
studies that may give us richer qualitative insights.   
 To conclude, the primary objective of my dissertation is to provide a deeper 
understanding of how corporate governance may affect firms' strategic decisions in 
family business firms. By theorizing, analyzing, and synthesizing the pursued research 
questions and data, I extend our knowledge of family business firms and provide a clear 
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roadmap for scholars exploring the link between corporate governance studies and 
strategy. 
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